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I.  INTRODUCTION 
he financial crisis and resulting rise in home foreclosures has 
drawn a great deal of attention in recent years.2 As housing 
prices fell and mortgage defaults grew, the financial services 
industry began to complain about a perceived increase in 
“strategic defaults.”3 A strategic default is a voluntary mortgage 
default and the subsequent abandonment of the home by a 
homeowner who has the financial ability to pay the mortgage. 
There is considerable debate among contract scholars about the 
morality of this action and I leave that debate to them.4 A more 
practical question is whether strategic defaults actually occur. 
Numerous researchers have tried to determine the circumstances 
                                                          
 2  THE FINANCIAL CRISIS COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, 280-91, 402-10 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter 
Commission Report]. 
 3  See generally FICO, FICO HELPS TOP MORTGAGE SERVICER COMBAT 
STRATEGIC DEFAULTS: $20 BILLION PROBLEM FACING MORTGAGE INDUSTRY 
CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION, (Oct. 10, 2011), 
http://www.fico.com/en/Company/News/Pages/10-10-2011.aspx; Keith Jurow, 
Strategic Defaults Revisited: This Could Get Very Ugly, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 
29, 2011, 10:18 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/strategic-defaults-
revisited-it-could-get-very-ugly-2011-4. 
 4  See generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: 
The Behavioral Economics of Strategic Default, 64 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1547, 
1582-83 (2011) (recognizing that due to the bad behavior of banks and the 
remote connections homeowners have to the lenders in a world of 
securitization, homeowners have fewer moral qualms about default); Brent T. 
White, The Morality of Strategic Default, ARIZ. L. STUD. (Discussion Paper 
No. 10-15, May 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1597835 (arguing that 
strategic default can be economically rational, and thereby a moral decision). 
But see Curtis Bridgeman, The Morality of Jingle Mail: Moral Myths about 
Strategic Default, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2011) (arguing that true 
strategic default, defaulting when you can afford to pay the mortgage, is not 
morally defensible); William Redmond, Strategic Foreclosure as an Indicator 
of Eroding Institutional Structures, 2 J. ECON. ISSUES 565 (2012) (arguing that 
the social acceptability of voluntary foreclosure is growing). For a broader 
discussion, see Meredith R. Miller, Strategic Default: The Popularization of a 
Debate Among Contract Scholars, 9 CORNELL REAL EST. REV. 32 (2011); 
Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral, (Harvard John M. Olin 
Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 531, Nov. 2005), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Shavell_531.pdf
; Seane Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract be Immoral?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
1551, 1552 (2009). 
T 
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under which homeowners choose strategic default.5 However, 
strategic defaults are not easily quantifiable because, as one 
industry study explains, “while the total number of defaults can 
be measured with a high degree of precision, whether or not those 
defaults are due to an inability to pay or an unwillingness to pay 
is typically unobservable from market data.”6 Therefore, the 
evidence to support the contention that the foreclosure crisis was 
caused by widespread strategic default is mixed, at best.7 The 
                                                          
 5  Currently, two general theories predominate: the strategic or ruthless 
default theory that holds that people will default when their mortgage exceeds 
their home equity by a defined threshold and the “two trigger” school which 
holds that the home equity differential, in and of itself, does not cause default. 
It must be combined with some kind of life crisis like divorce or job loss. Neil 
Bhutta, Jane Dokko, & Hui Shan, The Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage 
Default Decisions (Div. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs Fed. 
Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Paper No. 2010-35, 2010), at 3, 
available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201035/201035pap.pdf. See 
generally Younghend Deng, John M. Quigley, & Robert van Order, Mortgage 
Terminations, Heterogeneity, and the Exercise of Mortgage Options, 68 
ECONOMETRICS 275, 303 (2000) (finding a great deal of heterogeneity in the 
mortgage markets, making default predictions difficult. They do suggest, 
however, that homeowners with initial high loan to value loans are less likely 
to both default and pay off the loan early.); Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher 
Gerardi, & Paul S. Willen, Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and 
Evidence, 64 J. URB. ECON 234, 270 (2008) (concluding, in a study of 
Massachusetts homeowners, that most people with negative equity do not 
default); Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential 
Mortgage Default: Evidence from US States, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3139 (2011) 
(finding that strategic defaults are higher for homeowners with more expensive 
homes in states where banks have no recourse); Patrick Bajari, Sean Chu, & 
Minjung Park, An Empirical Model of Subprime Mortgage Default from 2000-
2007, (NBER Working Paper Series: Working Paper 14625, Dec. 2008), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14625 (finding securitization and 
pricing the reason for defaults). 
 6  MICHAEL J. SEILER, ANDREW J. COLLINS, & NINA H. FEFFERMAN, 
RES. INST. FOR HOUSING AM., STRATEGIC DEFAULT IN THE CONTEXT OF A 
SOCIAL NETWORK: AN EPIDEMIOLOGICAL APPROACH 16 (Oct. 2011), available 
at 
http://www.housingamerica.org/RIHA/RIHA/Publications/78456_10923_Rese
arch_RIHA_Default_Report.pdf. 
 7 See generally Bhutta, supra note 5, at 29(estimating that one in five 
mortgage defaults in the sample were strategic); Ghent, supra note 5, at 3177 
(finding that borrowers with property values over $200,000 at originations, in 
non-recourse state increases the possibility of strategic default); Deng, supra 
note 5, at 303 (concluding that the heterogeneity of mortgage borrowers cause 
variations in default behavior); Foote, supra note 5, at 245 (unable to verify 
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most we can say is there is some evidence to suggest strategic 
defaults are higher for well-to-do homeowners with expensive 
homes located in states where lenders cannot obtain deficiency 
judgments after default.8 Despite this, the financial industry has 
spent much time and effort creating models to predict strategic 
default9 instead of working to mitigate the losses in foreclosure.10 
In response, and in light of widespread reports of lender abuse, 
some commentators have actually begun to advocate strategic 
default as a smart economic strategy.11 Thus, it is unlikely that 
                                                          
that negative equity alone causes strategic defaults). 
 8  Ghent, supra note 5, at 3177. A deficiency judgment is an amount still 
owed to the lender at the end of the foreclosure process. For a more detailed 
discussion of deficiency judgments, see discussion infra Part III. 
 9  See generally Experian-Oliver Wyman Market Intelligence Report: 
Understanding Strategic default in mortgages, part one., 
www.marketintlligencereports.com; Experian-Oliver Wyman Market 
Intelligence Report: Understanding strategic default in mortgages: Q2 2010 
update, available at www.marketintlligencereports.com; Yuliya Demyankyk, 
RALPH S.J. KOIJEN, & OTTA A.C. VAN HEMERT, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
CLEVELAND, DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE 
DEFAULT, available at 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/seminars/2010/demyanyk.pdf?WT.oss=
determinants%20and%20consequences&WT.oss_r=392. 
 10  Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the 
Financial Crisis, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 3, 10 (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2254662. See generally 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-93, MORTGAGE SERVICER 
ACTIONS COULD HELP REDUCE THE FREQUENCY AND IMPACT OF 
ABANDONED FORECLOSURES (2010) [hereinafter GAO-11-93]; Kristin M. 
Pinkston, In the Weeds: Homeowners Falling Behind on their Mortgages, 
Lenders Playing the Foreclosure Game, and Cities Left Playing the Price, 34 S. 
ILL U. L. J. 621 (2010). 
 11  See generally Roger Lowenstein, Just Walk Away: Why should 
underwater homeowners behave any differently than banks?, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Jan. 7, 2010, at 15; Chris Taylor, What Happens when you Walk Away 
from your Home, REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2012, 2:52 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/27/us-housing-strategicdefault-
idUSTRE80Q1XX20120127; Brad Tuttle, Strategic Mortgage Default: The 
Irresponsible, Amoral, but best Strategy?, TIME (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://business.time.com/2010/01/11/strategic-mortgage-default-the-
irresponsible-amoral-but-best-strategy/print/; Mandi Woodruff, How to 
Strategically Default on Your Home and Live Scott-Free for Years, BUS. 
INSIDER (Dec. 30, 2011, 10:50 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/strategically-default-on-your-home-live-free-
2011-12?op=1. 
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the rise in foreclosed and abandoned properties12 was caused by 
strategic defaults.13 Instead, the cause may be a systematic 
abandonment of low and moderate income neighborhoods by the 
housing industry.14 
Whether strategic or not, mortgage defaults increased 
steadily from 2006 through 2011.15 In some situations, lenders 
moved swiftly after default to foreclose the property; but for other 
homeowners the foreclosure process began and then stalled or 
was completely abandoned by the lender.16 The result of these 
                                                          
 12  See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-34, 
VACANT PROPERTIES: GROWING NUMBER INCREASES COMMUNITIES’ COSTS 
AND CHALLENGES (2011); Thomas J. Billitteri, Blighted Cities: Is Demolishing 
parts of cities the way to save them?, 20 CQ RESEARCHER 941 (Nov. 12, 2010); 
CITY OF SOUTH BEND VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES TASK FORCE, 
VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES TASK FORCE REPORT, (Feb. 2013), 
available at 
http://southbendin.gov/sites/default/files/files/Code_FinalVATF_Report_2_red
.pdf. 
 13  Michael Hiltzik, Inflated threat of strategic default, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 
26, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/24/business/la-fi-hiltzik-
20120224; Richard DeKaser, ‘Strategic Defaults” less Common than Thought, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/05/AR2010080507381.html. 
 14  GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 14. See generally GEOFF SMITH & SARAH 
DUDA, WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE, LEFT BEHIND: TROUBLED FORECLOSED 
PROPERTIES AND SERVICER ACCOUNTABILITY IN CHICAGO 6 (Jan. 2011), 
available at 
http://www.woodstockinst.org/sites/default/files/attachments/leftbehind_jan20
11_smithduda_0.pdf (relating vacancies concentrated in minority 
neighborhoods to abandoned foreclosure); Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair of Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Remarks at the 2011 Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland Policy Summit, Housing Market Developments 
and Their Effects on Low-and Moderate Income Neighborhoods (June 9, 2011), 
available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20110609a.pdf; 
JUDITH FOX, RICHARD WILLIAMS & BRIAN MILLER, FORECLOSURES IN ST. 
JOSEPH COUNTY, INDIANA FROM 2001-2007 (2008) (on file with author) 
(finding a correlation between living in a minority neighborhood and 
foreclosure). 
 15  Commission Report, supra note 2, at 214-21 (describing the increase in 
mortgage deficiency by type of loan and region of the county); Shane M. 
Sherlund, Mortgage Defaults (Mar. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/region/foreclosure_resource_ce
nter/more_mortgage_defaults.pdf (showing an increase in mortgage defaults 
beginning in 2006, but real acceleration in 2009). 
 16 Linda Allen, Stavros Peristiani, & Yi Tang, Bank Delays in the 
Resolution of Delinquent Mortgages: the Problem of Limbo Loans (Fordham 
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abandoned foreclosures has been devastating to cities and 
consumers throughout the country.17 This article explores what is 
happening to homeowners caught up in the strange world of 
bank walkaways as the economy is beginning to improve. This 
second wave of collection activity, an echo of the original 
foreclosure crisis, could easily throw thousands of consumers 
back into financial hardship just as the economic recovery begins. 
Part I of this article explores the evidence of foreclosures 
started and then stalled or abandoned and their impact on 
consumers and communities. In Part II “the real zombie title” is 
introduced through evidence gathered in foreclosures in Indiana. 
This new form of “zombie loan” is a mortgage loan that has been 
foreclosed, but is suddenly and inexplicably “un-foreclosed.” The 
effect of zombie loans on homeowner, judicial system and 
communities is also explored. Finally, Part III discusses the 
increased presence of debt buyers in both the buying of loans and 
the collection of deficiency judgment in relation to the overall 
                                                          
University Schools of Business Research Paper No. 2018948), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2018948 (finding 21.79% 
of the loans in their sample of Florida foreclosures to be limbo loans); Linda E. 
Fisher, Shadowed by the Shadow Inventory: A Newark, New Jersey Case 
Study of Stalled Foreclosures and Their Consequences, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2013)  (finding that 37% of the cases in her study were in legal 
limbo); MICHAEL SCHRAMM, APRIL HIRSH, DIWAKAR VANAPALLI, DANIEL J. 
VAN GROL, KRISTA MOINE NELSON, & CLAUDIA COLTON, CENTER ON 
URBAN POVERTY AND CMTY. DEV., MANDEL SCH. OF APPLIED SOC. 
SCIENCES, STALLING THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS: THE COMPLEXITY 
BEHIND BANK WALKAWAYS (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://blog.case.edu/msass/2011/02/07/CUPCD_2011_02_07_Stalling%20the%
20foreclosure%20process-
%20the%20complexity%20behind%20bank%20walkaway.pdf (examining 
bank walkaways in Cleveland and finding that in 17% of their sample the 
bank had affirmatively walked away and in another 39% there was an 
unexplained delay by the bank in the foreclosure); KATIE BUITRAGO, 
WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE, DECIPHERING BLIGHT: VACANT BUILDINGS DATA 
COLLECTION IN THE CHICAGO SIX COUNTY REGION 3 (June 2013) 
[hereinafter DECIPHERING BLIGHT], available at 
http://www.woodstockinst.org/sites/default/files/attachments/decipheringblight
_buitrago_june2013.pdf (“the phenomenon of foreclosures that are initiated 
but not pursued to auction increased the likelihood that the properties become 
vacant”). 
 17 See generally Pinkston, supra note 10. These calls to default are often 
connected to reports of lender misbehavior, including the evidence that banks 
make similar decisions about walking away from properties that are too far 
underwater to be worth foreclosing. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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concern currently being voiced regarding the debt buying 
industry. The clever ways banks are managing their foreclosure 
inventory make clear that the effects of zombie loans must be 
mitigated in order to avoid a second economic downturn, the 
“foreclosure echo.” 
II.  ABANDONED FORCLOSURES 
Abandoned foreclosure, bank walkaway, “zombie title,” 
and “limbo loan” are all terms used to describe a situation where 
a homeowner is in default, but the foreclosure does not proceed in 
the normal fashion to the eventual sale of the.18 The phenomenon 
first surfaced in Midwestern rust belt states.19 Congress, at the 
urging of Ohio representatives, called for an investigation into the 
relationship between vacant properties and abandoned 
foreclosures. The General Accounting Office commenced a study 
that was released in November 2011.20 The study was limited in 
that it only examined loans owned by the large servicers and 
government sponsored entities.21 It concluded that most servicers 
do an equity analysis before determining whether to initiate a 
foreclosure.22 When it is not economically beneficial to foreclose, 
the lender charges-off23 the loan without initiating a foreclosure.24 
                                                          
 18  Different authors and commentators are using different terminology for 
the same actions. See GAO-11-93, supra note 10 (“abandoned foreclosure”); 
Allen et al., supra note 16 (limbo loans); SCHRAMM ET AL., supra note 16 (using 
the terminology “walkaway”); Michelle Conlin, Special Report: The latest 
foreclosure horror: the zombie title, REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2013, 1:58 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/10/us-usa-foreclosures-zombies-
idUSBRE9090G920130110 (coined the term “zombie title”). 
 19  Susan Saulny, Banks Starting to Walk Away on Foreclosure, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at A20, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/us/30walkaway.html?pagewanted=print; 
Sandra Livingston, Bank ‘walkaways’ from foreclosed homes a growing, 
troubling trend, THE PLAIN DEALER (last updated July 19, 2009, 6:33 PM), 
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro//print.html?entry=/2009/07/bank_walkaways_
from_foreclosed.html; Mary Ellen Podmolik, More banks walking away from 
homes, adding to the housing crisis, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-13/news/ct-biz-0113-walkaway—
20110113_1_foreclosure-process-foreclosure-filing-servicers. 
 20  GAO-11-93, supra note 10. 
 21   Id. at 14. 
 22  Id. at 15. 
 23  The accounting term “charge-off” means the company writes off the 
loan as uncollectable. This allows the bank to take a tax deduction for the loss. 
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Some lenders reported initiating a foreclosure, but abandoning it 
before the property was brought to final foreclosure sale.25 As 
illustrated in the GAO chart reproduced below, properties 
evaluated in the study were significantly more likely to be 
abandoned by the homeowner if the loan was charged-off after 
the foreclosure was initiated than if the charge-off occurred 
before the foreclosure process began.26 
 
27 
While the number of abandoned homes related to 
abandoned foreclosures in this study was small as a percentage of 
all foreclosures, they were concentrated in certain areas, thus 
becoming a disproportionate problem for those communities.28 Of 
those identified communities, most were located in the Midwest.29 
Since then, individual studies have documented the problem in 
Chicago, Illinois; Cleveland, Ohio; Newark, New Jersey; and the 
state of Florida.30 
                                                          
The lender can continue with collection efforts or sell the loan. 
 24  GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 15. 
 25  Id. at 16. 
 26  Id. at 17. 
 27  Id. 
 28  Id. at 16. 
 29  Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland and Indianapolis had the largest numbers 
of abandoned homes due to abandoned foreclosures. Of the top twenty, 
thirteen were in the Midwest. South Bend and Mishawaka, Indiana, though 
not listed in the top cities, were identified as communities where the overall 
number was too small to put them in the top twenty, but whose numbers of 
abandoned properties as a result of abandoned foreclosure were significant 
relative to the size of the community. Id. at 22. 
 30  See Allen et al., supra note 16; Fisher, supra note 16; SCHRAMM ET AL., 
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There can be significantly different legal consequences to 
homeowners depending on when in the default process the 
foreclosure is abandoned or what state the homeowner lives in. 
The case-specific information contained in this paper is from 
Indiana, a judicial foreclosure state.31 Some of the negative 
consequences to be discussed in this paper are only relevant to 
homeowners who live in a judicial foreclosure state. Others will 
only affect you if your state allows deficiency judgments. For 
some, your location does not matter. Thus far, all of the available 
studies have been conducted in judicial foreclosure states. This 
may be because the judicial process lends itself to inquiry. You 
can measure how many cases are filed and how many are 
followed through to completion. No such records exist in non-
judicial foreclosure states. It may also be that the very definition 
of an abandoned foreclosure requires there to be some kind of 
“process” that was started and never finished. However, there are also homeowners in default, but for whom no foreclosure has 
occurred in non-judicial foreclosure states;32 however, it is harder 
to document those cases. 
Because all the available studies of abandoned 
foreclosures are from judicial states, the focus of this discussion 
will be about the implications of these cases in judicial 
foreclosure settings. The specific procedures for judicial 
foreclosure vary from state-to-state, but as a general rule, once 
the homeowner defaults, the lender files a court action, obtains a 
foreclosure judgment, and then sells the property to satisfy that 
                                                          
supra note 16; DECIPHERING BLIGHT, supra note 16. 
 31  There are twenty states in which judicial foreclosure is the usual 
method of foreclosure: Connecticut (strict foreclosure), Delaware, Florida, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey 
(residential properties only), New York, New Mexico (recently amended to 
allow non-judicial foreclosure in loans after 2006), North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin. JOHN 
RAO ET. AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER FORECLOSURES: 
MORTGAGE SERVICING, MORTGAGE MODIFICATIONS, AND FORECLOSURE 
DEFENSE, App. E, 845-67. (National Consumer Law Center 4th ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter Foreclosure Defense]. 
 32  Realty Trac tracks foreclosure filings nationally. They report that the 
pre-foreclosure inventor rose 59% in the first quarter of 2013. The rise was not 
exclusive to judicial states, suggesting that the stalled foreclosure is not 
exclusively a judicial state phenomenon. REALTY TRAC, EXCLUSIVE REPORT: 
Q1 2013 FORECLOSURE INVENTORY UPDATE 1, 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.realtytrac.com/images/reportimages/RealtyTrac_Foreclosure_Inve
ntory_Analysis_Q1_2013.pdf. 
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judgment.33 If there is no buyer at the sale, the bank will often re-
purchase the asset.34 Evidence that a foreclosure can be 
abandoned at any stage of the process is provided by a review of 
Irwin Mortgage’s foreclosure filings in the doxpop electronic 
filing system from 2006 and 2007.35 Of the 157 foreclosures filed 
by Irwin Mortgage during this period, nearly one third could be 
categorized as abandoned foreclosures. Twenty-nine were filed 
and dismissed. Nine cases went to judgment, but the foreclosure 
sale never occurred. In another nineteen cases, judgment was 
entered and then vacated by the bank. The Governmental 
Accounting Office’s research concluded that most loans are 
charged-off before foreclosure is initiated.36 The situation that has 
created the most controversy, however, is when the foreclosure 
action is filed, but abandoned before a foreclosure judgment is 
entered.37 
  A.  Foreclosure Filed and Then Dismissed 
It is difficult to calculate the number of borrowers whose 
loans have simply been charged-off by the bank prior to initiating 
foreclosure; evidence from the six largest servicers prior to 2010 
documents the number at fewer than 20,000.38 Subsequent 
studies39 and anecdotal evidence40 suggest the phenomenon is far 
                                                          
 33  Id. 
 34  The failure of banks to maintain these properties is another serious, 
related problem. A growing body of evidence suggests that even if they do not 
walk away from the foreclosure, lenders are walking away from the property. 
See generally, NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, THE BANKS ARE BACK—
OUR NEIGHBORHOODS ARE NOT: DISCRIMINATION IN THE MAINTENANCE 
AND MARKETING OF REO PROPERTIES (2012) [hereinafter BANKS ARE BACK], 
available at 
http://www.nationalfairhousing,org/Portals/33/the_banks_are_back_web.pdf  
(examining the condition of bank owned properties in seven different 
communities across the country and finding significant disparities in how the 
banks maintained properties in majority white as opposed to minority 
neighborhoods). 
 35  Doxpop is an electronic database of court filings available at 
www.doxpop.com. Docket sheets are available for 82 counties in Indiana. 
Copies of the case docket are available, though copies of individual filings are 
not. 
 36  GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 16. 
 37   Conlin, supra note 18. 
 38  GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 17. 
 39  Allen et al., supra note 16, at 16 (concluding that 1/5 of all Florida’s 
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more pervasive. A foreclosure that is never filed, or one that is 
filed and later dismissed, is a mixed bag for consumers, but it is a 
better situation for neighbors. The GAO study found that 70% of 
homeowners remain in their homes if the loan is charged off and 
foreclosure never initiated.41  
If foreclosure is initiated, and then dismissed, the numbers 
drop to only 52%, though still more homeowners remain in their 
homes than abandon them.42 Take, for example, the story of 
Melissa Jones.43 Ms. Jones and her husband had a stable financial 
life until Mr. Jones became ill. As his situation deteriorated, 
Melissa found herself unable to work full time because of the 
need to be at home to care for her dying husband. When he 
finally passed away, the decline in her own income coupled with 
the loss of his disability income drove her into foreclosure. The 
bank filed a foreclosure action. This foreclosure was initiated 
early in the foreclosure crisis before any viable programs for loan 
modification were available for homeowners.44 When the 
                                                          
subprime mortgages originated between 2004 and 2008 are at some point 
“limbo loans.); Fisher, supra note 16 (finding that 37% of the cases in her study 
in Newark, New Jersey were in legal limbo); SCHRAMM ET AL., supra note 16 
(examining bank walkaways in Cleveland and finding that in 17% of their 
sample the bank had affirmatively walked away and in another 39% there was 
an unexplained delay by the bank in the foreclosure); DECIPHERING BLIGHT, 
supra note 16 (finding that abandoned foreclosure increased the likelihood of a 
property being vacant in Chicago). 
 40 For examples of homeowners caught up in abandoned foreclosures, see 
Conlin, supra note 18; Susan Saulny, When Living In Limbo Avoids Living On 
the Street, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2012, at A14. 
 41  GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 17. The study found that in 70% of the 
cases they looked at where foreclosure had not been initiated, the homeowner 
was still in the home. 
 42   Id. 
 43  Not her real name. The circumstances of this story and other client 
stories contained in this article are factual. Unless previously released to the 
press, I have changed the client’s name and inconsequential details to preserve 
the homeowner’s privacy. All parties consented to their stories appearing in 
this article. 
 44  The Hope for Homeowners program was initiated in 2008. It was a 
voluntary program and widely considered a failure. In the first seven months 
of the program only one borrower in the entire country had obtained a 
refinance. McCoy, supra note 10, at 10. The Obama administration made 
changes that did allow more homeowners to be assisted, but many still feel not 
enough is being done to assist homeowners. See generally Alan M. White, 
Rewriting Contracts, Wholesale: Data on Voluntary Mortgage Modifications 
from 2007 and 2008 Remittance Reports, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509 (2009); 
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students at Notre Dame’s Economic Justice Project45 examined 
the paperwork for the loan foreclosure, they became suspicious. 
After some investigation and diligent searching, the students 
located the bank employee who had allegedly signed the 
documents. More accurately, they found the woman whose name 
appeared on the paperwork. She had not, in fact, signed them.  
Instead, someone else had signed her name and she signed an 
affidavit for the Economic Justice Project attesting to the 
forgery.46 When these errors were brought to the bank’s attention, 
they dismissed the foreclosure, with prejudice.47 
In a study of Florida foreclosures, Allen, Peristianui and 
Tang, tested whether lost or missing documentation could 
account for the abandoned foreclosures they discovered in their 
Florida study.48  They dubbed this the “operational risk 
hypothesis.”49 They found that the “greater incidence of 
foreclosure case dismissals (resulting from legal and operational 
                                                          
Lynnley Browning, Distressed Owners Are Frustrated by Aid Group, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/business/02hope.html?_r=0; Dawn 
Kopecki & Theo Francis, U.S. May Retool Program for Underwater Borrowers 
(Update 1), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 2010, 9:56 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXET2r166YG
U. 
 45  The Economic Justice Program is the consumer clinic the author 
supervises as part of the Notre Dame Law School’s Clinical Law Center. 
Students, usually in their final year of law school, represent low and moderate-
income clients against foreclosure and related debt collection. 
 46  These documents are on file with the author. This occurred years before 
the robo-signing scandal became news. At the time, no one had heard of robo-
signing. Now we know that such occurrences were common in the industry. 
See generally DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 41491, 
“ROBO-SIGNING” AND OTHER ALLEGED DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS IN 
JUDICIAL AND NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCESSES 14 (2010) [hereinafter 
ROBO-SIGNING]. 
 47  A dismissal with prejudice would mean the lender cannot re-initiate the 
foreclosure filing. However, the Indiana Court of Appeals, in Afolabi v. Atl. 
Mort. & Inv. Corp., had found there is neither res judicata or claim preclusion 
prevented the lender from initiating foreclosure after a previous foreclosure 
had been lost in summary judgment. Afolabi v. Atl. Mort. & Inv. Corp, 849 
N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Each missed payment triggers a new 
default and a new right to foreclose. Id. While the facts in Ms. Jones’s case are 
distinguishable, it was not entirely clear that the bank could not re-file the 
foreclosure. 
 48   Allen et al., supra note 16, at 5. 
 49  Id. at 17. 
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problems) is associated with a greater likelihood that a loan 
remains in limbo.”50 Similarly, the Governmental Accounting 
Office found that “[t]he vast majority of abandoned foreclosures 
were loans that involved third-party investors including those 
that were securitized into private label [mortgaged-backed 
securities].”51 
Interestingly, the evidence from Florida also found that 
“the presence of MERS52 makes a delinquent loan more likely to 
end up in limbo.”53 Melissa’s loan was a MERS loan as well. The 
theory behind the MERS system is that MERS acts as the 
registered mortgage holder, allowing the mortgage to be sold 
while MERS maintains records of the equitable owner.54 
Unfortunately, the theory failed to translate well into practice and 
research shows that MERS has not operated as intended..55 In 
theory, one of two things should have occurred. Either the 
originating lender should have prepared “a blank mortgage 
assignment to be filled in later in the event that recording the 
assignment became necessary for foreclosure purposes”56 or 
MERS should have recorded the mortgage in its name as 
“nominee” and then kept track of the beneficial owner.57 
However, Professor White presents a third option, which was to 
“take neither step, so that when foreclosure becomes necessary, 
the servicer is forced to obtain an assignment (or perhaps 
fabricate one) from the original lender to the current owner.”58 
                                                          
 50  Id. at 28 (finding that “one-standard-deviation increase (14.2%) in 
dismissals is associated with a 9.4% increase in the probability that the loan 
remains in limbo.”) 
 51  GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 28. 
 52  MERS is the Mortgage Electronic Registry System. It was created to 
allow for the easy buying and selling of loans by “eliminating the need to 
record each mortgage assignment in county property records.” Alan M. White, 
Losing the Paper-Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer 
Protection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 486 (2012); See generally 
Commission Report, supra note 2, at 407 (explaining how standing problems 
with MERS exacerbated the foreclosure problems); Christopher L. Peterson, 
Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic Registration System’s Land 
Title Theory, 53 WM & MARY L. REV. 111 (2011) (describing MERS and its 
purpose, creation, and the problems it created in the land recording system). 
 53  Allen et al., supra note 16, at 28. 
 54   White, supra note 52, at 486. 
 55  Id. at 485-88. 
 56  Id. at 485. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
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This is exactly what happened in Melissa’s case. When the 
lender wanted to foreclose, the servicer did not have the 
paperwork. The original lender had been out of business for 
several years. An assignment was fabricated, ultimately resulting 
in the foreclosure being dismissed. Considering the many 
paperwork problems discovered in relation to securitized loans,59 
it is not surprising that these loans would be disproportionately 
abandoned. 
Dismissal in a mortgage foreclosure may seem like a good 
result for a homeowner, but in many ways it is not. After the 
dismissal, Melissa was in legal limbo. She made multiple attempts 
to contact the bank to negotiate ways to pay back the loan, but 
the bank had charged-off the loan so they would not discuss 
repayment with her. She did not have a clear title to facilitate a 
sale. The Economic Justice Project filed a quiet title action and 
was able to permanently remove the mortgage lien from her 
property. Removing the mortgage, however, does not solve the 
entire limbo loan problem. The original note, if it exists, can still 
be enforced against the homeowner.60 Indiana follows the 
common law rule that the mortgage follows the note.61 Granted, 
the mortgage was extinguished in the quiet title action, but this is 
such an unusual situation that it is hard to predict what a court 
might do with these facts. If the note ever re-appears, Melissa will 
owe a huge debt that she cannot possibly pay off. 
A pro se petitioner will likely have trouble succeeding on, 
let alone filing, a quiet title action. Most consumers in foreclosure 
are unrepresented62 and, therefore, will be unable to remove the 
                                                          
 59  See generally White, supra note 522 (describing many of the paperwork 
problems that appeared during the foreclosure crisis); ROBO-SIGNING, supra 
note 466, at 9 (describing how robo-signing and other issues manifest 
themselves in judicial foreclosure states). 
 60  IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-3.1-301 (West 2013). See also Douglas J. 
Whaley, Mortgage Foreclosure, Promissory notes, and the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 320–23 (2012) (explaining the 
general relationship between the note, the mortgage, and the Uniform 
Commercial Code in foreclosure); Elizabeth Renuart, Uneasy Intersections: 
The Right to Foreclose and the UCC, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 5 
(forthcoming, 2013) (explaining extensively the relationship between the UCC 
and foreclose in the context of different state jurisprudence). 
 61  This was codified in the IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9.1-203(g) (West 2013). 
See generally Whaley, supra note 60, at 320–23 (explaining the merger doctrine 
and the common law rule the “the mortgage follows the note”). 
 62  MELANCA CLARK & MAGGIE BARRON, BRENNAN CENTER FOR 
 
Fox Article - Final.docx (Do Not Delete)  11/20/2013 4:10 PM 
2013 The Foreclosure Echo 39 
mortgage lien from their home. If these homeowners need to 
move for business or personal reasons, their only option is to 
abandon the home. 
B.  Foreclosure Filed, Then Stalled 
Another category of borrowers are those for whom home 
foreclosure was filed in court, but not prosecuted to completion. 
These might best be called “stalled,” as opposed to abandoned, 
foreclosures. Some of these foreclosures are stalled because the 
lender cannot locate the proper paperwork,63 while others are in 
the endless loop that has become loss mitigation,64 and an 
undetermined number are bundled into new securities and sold 
back into the secondary market, often along with performing 
mortgages.65 Some lenders may simply be waiting for the 
economy to improve before proceeding. This is what happened to 
Nick, another client of the Economic Justice Project. 
Nick was sued for foreclosure in May 2010.66 At the time 
he was unemployed and did not qualify for a loan modification. 
He resigned himself to losing the house and put it up for sale. He 
was unable to find a buyer. He tried unsuccessfully to contact the 
bank. Nearly three years passed and then, unexpectedly, the bank 
asked the court to enter a foreclosure judgment. A new servicer 
was involved.67 Nick is now working and can afford to make 
payments. He is attempting to work with the bank to retain the 
home. This case is likely to have a happy ending; or is it? 
A stalled foreclosure case raises a number of problems for 
                                                          
JUSTICE, FORECLOSURES: A CRISIS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION 2 (2009) 
(documenting the lack of legal representation in foreclosure cases and the 
negative ramifications for homeowners). 
 63  David Streitfeld, Foreclosures Slow as Document Flaws Emerge, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2010, at A1. 
 64  See generally Commission Report, supra note 2, at 405; McCoy, supra 
note 10, at 47. 
 65  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF 
THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY T-5 (Jan, 2013). 
 66  Cause No. 71-D07-1005-MF-00411, St. Joseph Superior Court. 
 67  The loan may also have a new owner, which would explain some of the 
long delay. The homeowner never really knows who “owns” the loan. They 
only know who is servicing the loan. This is a frustration for the homeowner 
and complicates workout options. Servicers claim restrictions to modification 
that may or may not be true and most homeowners have no way to verify the 
claims. 
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the homeowner. Three years of interest and fees can substantially 
increase the balance due on a mortgage.68 It exacerbates the 
problem many homeowners already experience: that they owe 
more on the home than the home is worth. Faced with this 
dilemma, some may choose to walk away from the property.69 
The buying and selling of these distressed mortgage assets 
has become big business, again suggesting the number of these 
nonperforming loans is not small.70 Some of these buyers are 
willing to work with homeowners; others are looking to foreclose 
and flip the property.71 It is hard to know which is more 
                                                          
 68  Some have argued that this is a deliberate attempt to increase fees for 
the servicers. See McCoy, supra note 10, at 41–44 (for an explanation of the fee 
structure associated with mortgage servicing). 
 69  And now we have come full circle. Those who may not have 
strategically defaulted, strategically choose to give up attempts to save the 
home when faced with the growing balance due. The industry has doggedly 
resisted any principal write downs to save homes from foreclosure, even when 
the “principal” is really capitalized interest and fees. 
 70  John Collins Rudolf, Auctions for Troubled Property Loans Jump to the 
Web, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at B1; Janet Morrissey, New REITs Pounce 
on Distressed Mortgage Assets, TIME (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1916998,00.html#; Carolyn Said, 
Vulture investors buy up distressed mortgages, S.F. CHRON. (June 7, 2010, 4:00 
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Vulture-investors-buy-up-
distressed-mortgages-3262447.php. 
 71  HUD, when announcing its Distressed Asset Stabilization Program, 
highlights the fact that purchasers will be able to modify loans and still make 
money because of the low cost of the loan. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN 
DEV. HUD NO. 12-116, HUD ACCEPTING APPLICATIONS FOR ENTITIES TO 
PURCHASE TROUBLED MORTGAGES, OFFER CHANCE TO AVOID COSTLY 
FORECLOSURES AND STABILIZE NEIGHBORHOODS (July 18, 2012) [hereinafter 
HUD No. 12-116], 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_adviso
ries/2012/HUDNo.12-116. But see NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, 
FHA’S DISTRESSED ASSET SALES AND LOSS MITIGATION SHOULD BE 
REFORMED TO MAXIMIZE SUSTAINABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP SOLUTIONS (Aug. 
31, 2012) [hereinafter FHA REFORM], available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mortgage_servicing/fha
hud-%20asset-sales%20issue-brief31aug2012.pdf  (calling on HUD to require 
investors who purchase the loans to comply with HUD loss mitigation rules); 
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FHA’S DISTRESSED ASSET SALE 
PROGRAM SHOULD STRENGTHEN HOME RETENTION GOALS (Dec. 26, 2012) 
[hereinafter HOME RETENTION GOALS], available at 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mortgage_servicing/fha
-loan-sales-12262012.pdf (recommending changes in the distressed asset sale 
that provide more accountability and transparency). 
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beneficial to the economy; occupied homes are usually better than 
vacant properties, but homeowners whose loans are sold to 
investors can be left in uncertain and often expensive situations. 
C.  Foreclosure Abandoned After Judgment, Pre-sale 
Troubling stories have surfaced concerning homes that 
were foreclosed, but never sold to satisfy the judgment.72 Mercy is 
one such mortgage holder.73 In 2007, the Economic Justice 
Project represented almost exclusively mortgage defense clients. 
Mercy came in for assistance with a property issue that did not 
seem to fit the typical foreclosure profile. The Project’s student 
intern and I almost turned her away. Had we done so, I would 
not be writing this article. Mercy’s case first made me aware of 
the devastating effects of bank walkaways. 
Mercy was a recent immigrant, unsophisticated in 
American real estate practice. A local real estate investor 
convinced her that the way to succeed in America was through 
land speculation. She and several other recent immigrants were 
persuaded to purchase several rental properties.74 In one day, 
through one closing, Mercy signed closing documents for ten 
loans, several with the same bank. All the properties were rental 
properties, allegedly occupied with tenants. As it turned out, none 
of the properties had tenants and most were not habitable. The 
loan documents she signed accurately reflected her poverty-level 
income and lack of knowledge in real estate management. 
However, she never saw the documents submitted to the banks. 
                                                          
 72  See Conlin, supra note 18 (describing what she dubs the “zombie title” 
as a situation where the homeowner thinks his or her home was lost in 
foreclosure, only to discover the bank never took title and there are thousands 
of dollars of fees owed to local governments); Podmolik, supra note 19 
(discussing the problems loan walkaways are creating for municipalities); 
Saulny, supra note 19 (explaining the story of loans abandoned after 
judgment). 
 73  See Saulny, supra note 19 (featuring Mercy in one of the early stories of 
bank walkaways). 
 74  The perpetrators of this fraud were eventually convicted in federal 
court in three separate cases for their role in the scheme. United States v. 
Sheneman, No. 3:10-CR-00120 (01), WL 2906859 (N.D. Ind. July 16, 2012). See 
also Mary Kate Malone, Elder Sheneman gets eight years in South Bend 
mortgage fraud scheme, SOUTH BEND TRIB. (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://articles.southbendtribune.com/2011-09-14/news/30158261_1_superior-
mortgage-lending-tri-state-mortgage-mortgage-fraud-scheme. 
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Unsurprising, all the properties fell into foreclosure almost 
immediately.75 
Interestingly, it was not one of these foreclosures that 
brought Mercy to my office, but a notice from the City of South 
Bend informing her that one of her properties was in violation of 
city building codes. Mercy was confused. Two years earlier, she 
had appeared in St. Joseph Superior Court and agreed to the 
foreclosure and sale of this property.76 When Mercy came to my 
office, she brought a copy of the notice for sheriff’s sale. She had 
abandoned the property prior to the June 2007 sale date, and had 
not visited the property since. We were sure there had been a 
mistake and contacted the city to explain that Mercy no longer 
owned the property. We were wrong. The bank had filed the 
foreclosure. Mercy had, in fact, appeared in court and agreed to 
the entry of a judgment. The judgment had been entered, just as 
she remembered. The bank had requested a sheriff sale and a 
date had been set. Notice of that sale was sent to Mercy, as 
required by Indiana law.77 What Mercy did not know was that 
the sale never occurred. The bank cancelled it, presumably 
because it determined that the home was not worth selling. Mercy 
did not receive notice that the sale had been cancelled because no 
such notice is required by Indiana law. The property remained in 
Mercy’s name; therefore, she remained legally responsible for the 
maintenance.78 Unfortunately for Mercy, the city and her former 
neighbors, she had no knowledge of this obligation. The property 
had been uninhabited for a year and in that time vandals had 
stolen nearly everything of value, including the copper pipes and 
appliances. Eventually, the property was demolished. 
                                                          
 75  Cause No. 71-CO1-0605-MF-00430; 71-C01-0605-MF-00441; 71-CO1-
0605-MF-00440; 71-DO1-0606-MF-00611; 71-CO1-0606-MF-00497 ; 71-DO7-
0606-MF-00557; 71CO1-0606-MF-00483; 71DO5-0807-MF-00723; 71DO6-
0605-MF-00484. The mortgage on the tenth property has not been paid in 
many years, though no foreclosure has been filed. The property is not 
habitable. 
 76  Judgment was entered on 7/10/2006. The sale was set for 6/21/2007. 71-
D07-0696-MF-00557. 
 77  IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-7-3(c) (West 2013). 
 78  Under Indiana law, the home remains in the name of the homeowner 
until sheriff’s sale. The foreclosure judgment allows the bank to petition for 
the sale, but it does not divest the homeowner of ownership of the property. 
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-7-11 (West 2013). In normal times, this was a good 
thing. In the era of abandoned foreclosures, it has become a nightmare for 
many homeowners. 
Fox Article - Final.docx (Do Not Delete)  11/20/2013 4:10 PM 
2013 The Foreclosure Echo 43 
Mercy’s story is all too common.79 Through conversations 
with the City of South Bend’s code enforcement office, we 
discovered that this “happens all the time.”80 A special report by 
Reuters documented homeowners in Columbus, Ohio, Cleveland, 
Ohio and Buffalo, New York facing similar circumstances.81 The 
number of cases in front of Cleveland Housing Court Judge 
Raymond Pianka involving “derelict properties” has doubled in 
recent years, “due largely to homes vacated by people who fled 
before an imminent foreclosure sale, only to learn later that they 
remain legally responsible for their house.”82 A Woodstock 
Institute study of vacant properties in Chicago found that homes 
were more likely to become vacant when foreclosure was 
initiated, but not followed through to sale.83 This situation can 
create different problems, depending on the laws in your 
particular community. In Cleveland, the homeowner can find 
herself facing multiple fines and court costs. In Mercy’s 
hometown of South Bend, Indiana, the number of these cases has 
doubled since 2006.84 
III. THE REAL “ZOMBIE TITLE” 
Michelle Conlin of Reuters coined the term “zombie title” 
to explain these uncompleted foreclosures.85 While the 
homeowners she described as having “zombie titles” faced 
significant problems, a truer form of “zombie title” has entered 
the market—a home that is foreclosed, never set for sale, and 
then “un-foreclosed” by the lender. The note and mortgage are 
inexplicably re-born. 
It is hard to determine how many of these “zombie titles” 
are really lurking in the shadows of the mortgage industry. 
Foreclosure is a state court process and there is no efficient way 
                                                          
 79  Conlin, supra note 18. 
 80  Interviews with Ann Carol Nash and Cathy Toppel, City of South 
Bend, March 3, 2009. 
 81  Conlin, supra note 18. 
 82  Id. 
 83  DECIPHERING BLIGHT, supra note 16, at 3. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Conlin, supra note 18. “Zombie title” is an obvious reference to the term 
“zombie debt”, which has become widely recognized in the debt collection 
world as referring to debt that is very old, usually beyond the statute of 
limitation or already discharged in bankruptcy that is seemingly re-born by a 
debt collector who aggressively works to collect. 
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to search court filings to determine the number of cases where a 
foreclosure judgment was entered and subsequently set aside.86 
Indiana does not have an online filing or records system, although 
approximately one half of Indiana’s counties record their docket 
sheets in an online docket system, doxpop.87 A search from 
January 1, 2009 to July 1, 2011 revealed hundreds of cases where 
the judgment was set aside, but did not reveal much about why 
the judgment was set aside. Judge Manier, a St. Joseph County 
Superior Judge, reports a recent increase in the number of 
requests to set aside foreclosure judgments.88 In a study of 
abandoned foreclosures in Cleveland, researchers categorized 
17% of the loans in the sample as loans where the bank had either 
set aside a previously awarded judgment or notified the court it 
did not want to proceed.89 In the vast majority of cases, no reason 
was given for the motions to vacate or dismiss.90 In her study of 
Newark, New Jersey foreclosures, Linda Fisher also found 
evidence of judgments that were being set aside.91 These 
additional findings are consistent with mine. I am, therefore, 
confident in stating that banks are going back into foreclosure 
cases and setting aside previously entered foreclosure judgments. 
I am less confident stating one definitive reason for the 
practice. A review of files in St. Joseph, LaPorte, Allen and 
Elkhart counties suggests some reasons, but it is impossible to 
state one definitive cause for this phenomenon. Lenders tend to 
give vague or nonexistent reasons for seeking to vacate a 
judgment.92 A closer examination of some of the files illustrates 
                                                          
 86  State Court Caseload Statistics, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT (last 
visited September 9, 2013), http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/stateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx. 
 87  DOXPOP, http://www.doxpop.com/ (last visited September 26, 2013). 
 88  Hearing Transcript at 12-13, JP Morgan Chase v. Pinckert, No. 71D05-
1208-MF-00529 (St. Joseph Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2013) [hereinafter 
Hearing Transcript]. 
 89  SCHRAMM ET AL., supra note 16, at 7. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Fisher, supra note 16, at 37-38. 
 92  SCHRAMM ET AL., supra note 16, at 7. (In one case the study cites the 
lender moved to set aside the judgment because “the parties had resolved the 
matter.” When the judge inquired further, the bank admitted that the parties 
had not resolved the matter. The low equity in the property was the real 
reason for setting aside the judgment.). In my review of files, language 
implying the parties had settled was common. In every case that the judge 
inquired, it turned out to be untrue. See infra Part II.C. 
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the difficulty in determining the real motivation behind these 
zombie loans. 
A.  The Doctrine of Merger and its Implication in the Selling of 
Distressed Mortgages 
Donna had what I would characterize as an abandoned 
mortgage, not a “zombie title.”93 However, her story best explains 
how a mortgage loan might move from being simply abandoned 
to being re-born as “zombie title.” When Donna came to the 
Economic Justice Project for assistance, her home had already 
been foreclosed.94 In the ensuing two years, the house had fallen 
into disrepair. Donna had been surprised to receive a complaint 
for a second foreclosure proceeding on the same mortgage note. 
She did not have a second mortgage, nor did she recognize the 
name of the company that was foreclosing. We later determined it 
was an investor. The investor claimed it had purchased the note 
from the lender. The lender, likewise, appeared and claimed it 
had sold the note and mortgage to the investor after entry of the 
judgment. 
The doctrine of merger makes the lender’s and the 
investor’s understanding of the situation legally impossible. 
According to this longstanding doctrine, when a judgment is 
entered the underlying claim merges into that judgment.95 In a 
foreclosure, the underlying claim would be the note and the 
                                                          
 93  Donna has agreed to let us discuss her situation, but requested to 
protect her anonymity. The specifics of this case are not as important as the 
legal implications. Therefore, I am not providing the file numbers and parties’ 
names in order to obscure her identity. The records are public and on file with 
the St. Joseph Superior Court. 
 94  Because of a prior foreclosure, the judgment was “in rem” and did not, 
as is customary in Indiana, include a personal judgment on the note. 
 95  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 cmt. a (1982). See In re 
Schlect, 36 B.R. 236, 240 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1983) (finding promissory note had 
merged into the foreclosure judgment previously entered in state court and, 
therefore, the provision in that note that allowed for the payment of attorney’s 
fees did not apply in the bankruptcy court); Caine & Weiner v. Barker, 713 
P.2d 1133, 1134 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (judgment awarded against two signers 
of a promissory note; when one paid the debt and then tried to obtain 
attorney’s fees provided for in the note from the second debtor, the court found 
that the note had merged into the judgment); But see In re Gayle, 189 B.R. 
919, 920 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1995) (bank foreclosed in a non-judicial proceeding 
and then obtained a separate court judgment on the note; the court held that 
the doctrine of merger did not preclude a bank from pursuing the foreclosure). 
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mortgage, both of which merge into the foreclosure judgment 
once it is entered. Simply put, when the lender allegedly sold this 
note to an investor, there was no promissory note to sell. There 
was only a judgment. 
This case eventually came to a satisfactory conclusion as 
the bank agreed to assign its judgment to the investor. 
Procedurally, this is what the bank should have done if it wanted 
to charge-off the loan after the judgment was entered. The 
assignment of judgment allowed the investor to proceed with the 
sheriff’s sale. The investor ultimately took possession by bidding 
the judgment amount at the sale. 
This case illustrates several important issues for 
discussion. First, it suggests that at least some of the underlying 
loans connected to the abandoned foreclosures are being sold on 
the secondary market. It also appears these sales may occur 
despite the fact that there is no longer a promissory note to sell.96 
Of course, the experience of one homeowner does not prove a 
pattern; though it does provide evidence for one. Additional 
evidence is found in the fact that throughout the process, the 
investor, the mortgage servicer, and their legal representatives 
failed to understand the doctrine of merger and the legal 
implications of the prior foreclosure judgment. As a result, 
judicial resources and attorney time were wasted. This experience 
left my students and me with few doubts that this has occurred to 
other, unrepresented homeowners and helps to explain why some 
lenders may be seeking to vacate judgments, thereby creating a 
“zombie title.” 
1.  Trial Rule 60 
The doctrine of merger makes it favorable for the lender to 
set aside the mortgage judgment when it wants to sell a 
nonperforming mortgage loan. Because these loans were 
judicially foreclosed, a lender must return to court to set aside the 
judgment. How and when that can be accomplished is governed 
by the rules of civil procedure. Most courts follow either Rule 60 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a close variation of it.97 
Indiana’s trial rule, while not identical, is the same as the federal 
                                                          
 96  See infra Part III for a discussion on how the industry seems to be 
working around this problem. 
 97  FED. R. CIV. P. 60. 
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rules in terms of the issues relevant to this discussion.98 It is 
unusual for the prevailing party to seek to set aside a judgment, 
therefore the decisions discussing this issue are almost exclusively 
concerned with not prejudicing the party for whom the judgment 
was entered. The courts seem to assume that setting aside a 
judgment will always be a good thing for the losing party. The 
concept of a “zombie title” challenges that assumption. 
One of the most troubling aspects of the “zombie title” is 
the fact that lenders rarely supply reasons, let alone accurate 
ones, to support a motion to vacate a foreclosure judgment. 
Furthermore, lenders virtually never cite the relevant portion of 
the law to support such a motion. A judgment can be set aside for 
a number of reasons, including “mistake, surprise or excusable 
neglect.”99 The usual parties to a mortgage foreclosure action are 
the homeowner, who in this case was already informed his home 
was foreclosed, and the loan servicer, who now wants to un-
foreclose the loan. None of the files I reviewed mention “mistake, 
surprise or excusable neglect”100 as a reason to support the motion 
to vacate judgment, nor do any of the reports of other studies 
mention this as a reason for setting aside a judgment. 
A judgment may also be set aside for “fraud” or “newly 
discovered evidence”.101 Again, no lender cited these as reasons to 
set aside the judgment. The most common reason stated in 
motions to set aside judgment was language implying that a 
settlement had been reached.102  Examples include: “all matters in 
controversy have since been settled”103 and “the subject matter of 
                                                          
 98  IND. TRIAL R. 60. Both rules allow for the correction of clerical errors 
and require the motion be filed within one year when claiming “mistake, 
surprise or excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence or fraud.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 60(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3); IND. TRIAL R. 60(B)(1), (B)(2), (B)(3). Both rules 
also allow litigants to file a motion within a reasonable time for three 
additional reasons: “the judgment is void”, “the judgment has been satisfied, 
released or discharged,” and “any other reason” justifying relief. FED. R. CIV. 
P. 60(b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6); IND. TRIAL R. 60. 60(B)(6), (B)(7), (B)(8). The Indiana 
rule includes additional reasons for setting aside a default judgment for lack of 
proper notice and judgments involving guardians or representatives. IND. 
TRIAL R. 60(B)(4), (B)(5). 
 99  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1); IND. TRIAL R. 60(B)(1). 
 100  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1); IND. TRIAL R. 60(B)(1). 
 101  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2), (b)(3); IND. TRIAL R. 60(B)(2), (B)(3). 
 102  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5); IND. TRIAL R. 60(B)(7). 
 103  See, e.g., Motion to Set Aside Judgment, HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. 
Harvell, No. 20C01-1205-MF-00355 (Elkhart Cnty., Ind. Cir. Ct. DATE) 
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this present litigation is no longer at issue.”104 
One motion stated that because the loan had been 
charged-off, the lender wanted to set it aside.105 While not a valid 
reason under Trial Rule 60, it was at least an honest one. The 
judge denied the motion.106 Most of the files contain no 
information about how the homeowners reacted to these motions 
because servicers rarely notify homeowners of the decision to 
charge-off the loan.107 The lack of notice to other parties was 
consistent in all the motions to vacate judgment I examined. 
When notice is given, it is often to the already abandoned 
property address. Occasionally a court sets the matter for hearing 
on its own initiative.108 That is when things get interesting.109 
Unfortunately, there is evidence that at least some of the 
stated reasons for setting aside the judgment are not truthful. In 
the Cleveland study, for example, the investigators discuss one 
lender who claimed that “the parties had resolved the matter” 
and, therefore, the foreclosure judgment should be set aside.110 
When questioned by the Court, the lender admitted that the real 
reason it wanted to set aside the judgment was the lack of equity 
in the property.111 Settlement is a valid reason to set aside a 
judgment, so long as the motion is brought within a reasonable 
time.112 Claiming there is a settlement when there is not a 
settlement so that you can earn more money is never a 
permissible reason to vacate or set aside a judgment. 
                                                          
 104  Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and to 
Dismiss Complaint to Foreclose Mortgage, Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Moore, 
No. 02D01-0901-MF-66 (Allen Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2010). 
 105  Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Dismiss Lawsuit, Without 
Prejudice, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Yusuph, No. 71-D05-0907-MF-
00671 (St. Joseph Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 12, 2010) [hereinafter 
Yusuph Motion to Set Aside Judgment]. 
 106  See infra Part II.A.2. for further discussion of this case. 
 107  Abandoned Foreclosures, supra note 17, at 38. 
 108  See, e.g., Hearing Transcript, supra note 88, at 3. Unfortunately, in 
most cases notice is sent to an already vacant property. 
 109   See discussion infra notes135-153 and accompanying text. 
 110   SCHRAMM ET AL., supra note 16, at 7. 
 111  Id. 
 112  OHIO R. CIVIL P. 60. The motions to set aside default I discovered in 
Indiana were filed between a few days after the judgment was entered to six 
years after judgment. 
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2.  Agreed Judgments, “In-rem” Judgments 
A disturbing subset of these cases involves motions to 
vacate that seek to set aside an agreed, “in-rem”113 judgment of 
foreclosure. This came to my attention early in my research when 
I stumbled upon JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Yusuph, a case 
filed in 2009.114 The pleadings indicate that at the time of this 
foreclosure the home was in serious disrepair.115 The City of 
South Bend entered the case because it had a pending repair 
order against the property for violations of the Unsafe Building 
Act.116 An agreed, “in rem” foreclosure judgment was entered in 
December 2009.117 In April 2010, Chase filed a motion to set aside 
the judgment because the bank had “charged off this mortgage 
loan account.”118 Neither the homeowner who had defaulted, nor 
the City which had agreed to the entry of the judgment, were 
notified of the motion.119 The bank did not request a hearing. 
The judge originally signed an order vacating the 
judgment.120 However, the judge reconsidered and set the matter 
for hearing.121 After the hearing, the judge entered an order 
                                                          
 113  An “in rem” judgment can only be satisfied with the proceeds from the 
sale of the home. No personal liability attaches to the homeowner. 
 114  It should be noted that the affidavit filed in support of the judgment in 
this matter was clearly a stamped signature. Exhibit A, Motion for Default 
Judgment Entry and Decree of Foreclosure, Yusuph, No. 71-D05-0907-MF-
00671 (filed Nov. 4, 2009).  This case was decided before Chase halted its 
foreclosures for a period of time in September 2010 in response to robo-signing 
accusations. See generally, ROBO-SIGNING, supra note 46, at 1 (for a 
description of the robo-signing scandal). 
 115  Answer, Yusuph, No. 71-D05-0907-MF-00671, (filed July 16, 2009 by 
the City of South Bend, Indiana) [hereinafter Yusuph Answer]. 
 116  IND. CODE ANN. §36-7-9-26 (West 2013). 
 117  Agreed Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, Yusuph, No. 71-D05-
0907-MF-00671 (Dec. 17, 2009). An “in rem” foreclosure judgment in Indiana 
is judgment that can only be executed against the secured property that was 
subject to the foreclosure. Lenders have the option to also ask the court a 
personal judgment that can be collected against any other assets of the 
defendant. In this case, the bank only requested an “in rem” judgment. 
 118  Yusuph Motion to Set Aside Judgment, supra note 105. 
 119  While it is hard to prove a negative, there was no proof of service 
attached to the motion, nor was there a notice of hearing in the court file. 
 120  Order Setting Aside the Judgment and Dismissing the Lawsuit, 
Without Prejudice or Consent, Yusuph, No. 71-D05-0907-MF-00671 (filed 
April 12, 2010). 
 121  Order, Yusuph, No. 71-D05-0907-MF-00671 (setting hearing for 
December 7, 2010). The court cites the “extent to which the Motion to Vacate 
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reinstating and confirming the judgment.122 It was the correct 
decision in this circumstance as setting aside a default judgment 
is much different than setting aside a judgment that had been 
agreed to by the parties. It is well recognized in Indiana that 
“after entering an agreed judgment the trial court has no 
authority to modify or change the judgment in any essential or 
material way.”123 In the JP Morgan case described above, the 
homeowner had been defaulted but the City of South Bend, also 
a defendant, had participated in the case and signed the 
agreement for an “in rem” only judgment against the 
homeowner.124 
While there is no conclusive evidence as to why the bank 
sought to set this judgment aside, there are a number of clues in 
the case files. First, the property was in serious disrepair.  There 
were pending orders to repair this property that had apparently 
been ignored.125  The typical procedural step after a foreclosure 
would be to set the property for sheriff’s sale.126 However, the 
property had already been dubbed “unsafe” by an administrative 
proceeding of the city.127 As a result, it was highly unlikely that 
anyone would purchase the property because, if they did, they 
would become responsible for the repairs. Accordingly, if the 
bank purchased the property in the sale—the usual procedure 
when there are no other bidders—it would be left to make the 
                                                          
Judgment and Dismiss the case compromises Defendant’s agreement to entry 
of an in Rem Judgment” as the reason for setting the hearing. 
 122   Order, JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Yusuph, No. 71-D05-0907-MF-
00671 (reinstating and confirming the judgment). 
 123  Wagler v. West Boggs Sewer District, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 363, 376 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2012). This principal is not confined to Indiana. Most states follow 
this rule. See, e.g., Bryan v. Reynolds, 123 A.2d 192 (Conn. 1956) (stipulated 
judgments cannot be set aside unless it is shown they were obtained by fraud, 
duress, accident or mistake); Westfall v. Wilson, 467 P.2d 966 (Or. 1970) 
(consent judgments can only be changed by agreement of all parties); Laffin v. 
Laffin, 760 N.W.2d 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008 ) (consent judgments cannot be 
modified absent fraud, mistake or unconscionable advantage); Baran v. Baran, 
72 A.2d 623 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1950) (consent decree can only be reviewed if 
obtained by fraud or based on mutual mistake). 
 124  Agreed Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, Yusuph, No. 71-D05-
0907-MF-00671 (filed Dec. 17, 2009). The city of South Bend was defendant 
because of fines and other actions to the property as a result of its being 
abandoned. 
 125   Yusuph Answer, supra note 115. 
 126   IND. CODE ANN. §32-29-7-3 (West 2013). 
 127   Yusuph Answer, supra note 115. 
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repairs. Therefore, it is not surprising that the bank decided this 
asset was not worth acquiring and never set the sale.128 
As discussed previously, lenders appear unconcerned with 
simply walking away from foreclosures when it is not economical 
to proceed. Doing so requires no affirmative action and, at least 
currently, violates no laws.129 What made this loan different? For 
one, it was an “in rem” judgment.130 The lender’s recovery was 
limited to the amount it could receive from the sale of the 
property, and the difference between the sale amount and the 
amount of the loan would be lost. The lender would not be able 
to sell the property without making substantial repairs and, even 
then, it was not likely to recover the entire amount of the loan.131 
The reason the lender articulated for asking the court to set aside 
the judgment was that the bank had charged off the loan.132 The 
fact that a debt has been charged off is usually a reason to seek 
judgment from the court, not a reason to set one aside. That is, of 
course, if the creditor intends to collect on that judgment. In this 
circumstance, Chase could not realistically collect on the debt. 
They had not obtained a personal judgment, so they could not 
attempt to collect against the homeowner’s wages or other assets.  
The home, as mentioned previously, was not likely to sell at 
sheriff’s sale. 
However, there was one way that the bank could recover 
some of its loss. It could sell the note. This foreclosure occurred at 
about the same time that the buying and selling of distressed 
mortgages was heating up.133 As Donna’s case illustrated, in order 
                                                          
 128  Numerous allegations were being made at the time that banks were 
failing to maintain properties it owned in low income neighborhoods. This 
property was just such a neighborhood. See generally, BANKS ARE BACK, 
supra note 34. 
 129  GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 16. 
 130  Without ordering an expensive transcript, it is impossible to determine 
why the judgment was in rem. A search of the bankruptcy records does not 
reveal a bankruptcy, the most common reason for the entry of an “in rem” 
judgment. 
 131  Various on-line websites list the value of this property between $27,600 
(trulia.com, last visited September 4, 2013) and $28,327 (zillow.com, last 
visited September 4, 2013). The judgment entered in December, 2009 showed 
the homeowner owed $62,597.01, more than double the value of the home in 
its current, repaired condition. 
 132  Yusuph Motion to Set Aside Judgment, supra note 105, at ¶ 3. 
 133  Janet Morrissey, New REITs Pounce on Distressed Mortgage Assets, 
TIME (Aug. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1916998,00.html#; Carolyn Said, 
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to properly bundle this loan with other loans for sale, the note 
must be un-merged from the judgment.134 Therefore, the most 
likely reason the bank sought to set aside the judgment was a 
desire to sell the note on the secondary market. 
A rare hearing that occurred in JP Morgan Chase v. 
Pinckert135 provides a glimpse of the serious issues these cases 
raise. The court in Pinckert set a hearing on two cases in which 
the same law firm had filed motions to set aside default 
judgments.136 The lender had filed a motion to vacate judgment 
and to reinstate the note, but apparently did not supply a reason 
that satisfied the court.137 The court asked the attorney to explain 
the reason for the motion.138 His response was: 
Well, I do, but only in a general sense. Sometimes we get 
information that will say ‘short sale completed’ or ‘deed 
in lieu’ or something of that nature, or ‘loan 
modification completed.’ On both of these, the message 
that we got . . . And that message just says ‘loss 
mitigation.139 
The court stated, “I’m not quite sure how to understand a 
loss mitigation if we may not even have one party,” expressing 
concern that though there were two defendants, Merlin and 
Ginger Pinckert, Ginger had only been served by publication.140 
After looking through the file, the court informed the attorney 
that Mrs. Pinckert was deceased.141 The Court then continued to 
explore what “loss mitigation” might mean. 
Court: You don’t know if the term “loss mitigation” is 
                                                          
Vulture investors buy up distressed mortgages, S.F. CHRON. (June 7, 2010), 
available at http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Vulture-investors-buy-up-
distressed-mortgages-3262447.php; Hui-yong Yu & Jason Kelly, Blackstone 
Sees Two-Year Window to Buy Houses: Mortgages, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14 
2012 4:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-14/blackstone-sees-
two-year-window-to-buy-houses-mortgages.html. 
 134  See discussion of merger, supra note 95. 
 135  See Hearing Transcript, supra note 88. 
 136  Id. at 3. There is no specific information about the second matter. It is 
simply referred to in the opening of the hearing. 
 137  Id. 
 138  Id. 
 139  Id. 
 140  Id. at 3-4. 
 141  Id. at 4. 
Fox Article - Final.docx (Do Not Delete)  11/20/2013 4:10 PM 
2013 The Foreclosure Echo 53 
used for something other than resolving the matter 
personally with the borrower? 
Attorney: It’s my experience it’s not for that. I mean, 
let’s put it this way: it’s some form of loss mitigation, so 
it may be—especially given the fact that Miss Pinckert 
is deceased—it may be a deed in lieu or it may be some 
type of short sale. 
Court: I guess my concern is it doesn’t mean that one is 
mitigating the loss to the financial institution by 
changing its mind, and rather than foreclosing and 
having a deficiency judgment and a piece of property 
you may or may not want, it’s now decided to sell this 
debt to142 
The attorney misunderstood the judge and interrupts her 
to explain that the bank does not set aside judgments when it is 
changing servicers.143  The court, however, was not concerned 
about a change in servicer.  The court was concerned about a 
change in ownership. That was clearly not what the court was 
referencing. The court was clearly expressing a concern about 
debt buyers, not servicer transfers. 
Court: Yet we seem to be finding—I’ve had, within the 
last couple weeks, quite a number of motions to vacate 
and dismiss. And one attorney said he thought perhaps 
Fannie Mae had directed this, that they were directing 
it. But he didn’t have a lot more information. My big 
concern is that someone has walked away from this 
foreclosure, they may even have gotten an in rem 
judgment. They’ve walked away, and they don’t 
necessarily know that the judgment’s now been 
vacated. What, the debt reinstated to be transferred to 
someone else that’s going to seek some other remedy?144 
The court thus identified the crux of the problem with 
“zombie titles.” When a judgment is set aside and the loan   
reinstated, it can be transferred to someone else who is likely to 
pursue another remedy. An “in rem” judgment can easily become 
                                                          
 142  Id. at 4-5. 
 143  Id. at 5. 
 144  Id. at 6. 
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an “in personam” judgment with no notice to the debtor.  
At this point, the hearing took a rather bizarre twist. The 
court asked why the underlying judgment was “in rem.”145 The 
lawyer claimed the homeowner filed bankruptcy, but as they 
investigated the file, it turned out to be untrue.146 However, the 
lawyer ultimately discovered an agreed “in-rem” judgment in the 
file: 
Attorney: We have—-we have an agreed entry. We 
haven’t sent that your way. I apologize. It’s signed by 
XXX for Real Services,147 legal guardian for Merlin 
Pinckert. 
Court: That’s not the judgment I signed and it’s not 
been –I don’t see that in the file. 
Attorney: Merlin Pinckert, right? 
Court: So this person is under a guardianship? 
Attorney: That’s correct. 
Court: Not according to anything on the docket sheet or 
in the file.148 
The attorney goes on to inform the court that the guardian 
                                                          
 145  Id. at 8. 
 146  Id. 
 147  Real Services is a not-for-profit agency in South Bend that often acts as 
guardians for indigent senior citizens who are deemed incompetent to manage 
their affairs. The name of the guardian has been redacted. 
 148  Hearing Transcript, supra note 88, at 9. If a person is under a 
guardianship, Indiana Trial Rule 4.2(c) suggests there is a duty to inform the 
court if one of the litigants is incompetent, the situation if a guardian had been 
appointed. IND. TRIAL R. 4.2(c). The attorney complained that he did not 
know there was a guardianship because the dockets are not online in St. 
Joseph County. Hearing Transcript, supra note 83, at 13. The guardianship 
dockets are online through the Quest system in the St. Joseph Probate Court. 
In addition, he had already informed the court that the agreement, signed by 
the guardian, was in the file. Id. at 13. Had he looked at the free, online 
system, the attorney would have seen that the Probate Court had approved the 
sale of this property on July 23, a month before the hearing in Superior Court. 
In fact, according to the Probate Court records, 71J02-1111-GU-00220, this 
property was already sold. The question remains: what was the purpose of the 
motion to vacate? 
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had signed an in-rem agreement, but that a different in-rem 
judgment was submitted to the court.149 
This is the one and only case in my review where the 
lender’s reason for the motion to vacate and to set aside the 
judgment was clear: 
Attorney: So once they vacate it [the property in 
foreclosure], if Mr. Pinckert is in an end-of-life situation, 
his wife is already deceased, apparently none of his 
family wants this home, it may fall into disrepair and 
ultimately become the obligation of the city, which is 
unfortunate, but –and I know there’s been discussions 
about that in the legislature, but nothing has come of it. 
And I think legally my client is entitled; they don’t have 
an obligation in that regard. But that sounds, quite 
frankly, more likely than loss mitigation.150 
The attorney in this matter either did not understand or 
deliberately dodged the judge’s question regarding the selling of 
the note. Though the court clearly understood and questioned the 
propriety of setting aside an in rem judgment and exposing the 
debtor to further collection.151 The lawyer honestly replied that 
“as a legal matter I don’t think that my client is prohibited from 
doing that.”152 As a legal matter, he may be correct; but as a moral 
matter, there is likely a different answer.153 
It is clear that many of these “zombie titles” are being re-
sold in the secondary market and it seems that many were sold to 
PennyMac, a “finance company run almost entirely by alumni of 
Countrywide Financial.”154 This should be frightening to anyone 
who has followed the mortgage industry. Countrywide loans were 
a significant contributor to the mortgage foreclosure crisis.155 
                                                          
 149  Id. at 10. 
 150  Id. at 12. 
 151  Id. at 7. 
 152  Id. 
 153  A plaintiff or a defendant has the right to set aside a judgment 
pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60.  Whether or not the rule is being fully 
complied with is a major concern. 
 154  Stephen Gandel, Countrywide: It’s baaack, FORTUNE (Oct. 2, 2012, 
6:00 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/10/02/countrywide-is-back-
pennymac/. 
 155  Commission Report, supra note 2, at 248-50. 
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Below is a very small sample of the loans I discovered illustrating 
the “zombie loan” pattern: 
 
LENDER 
FORECLOSURE 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT 
SET ASIDE 
PENNYMAC 
FILES 
FORECLOSURE 
JUDGMENT 
ENTERED 
Citimortgage
156 12/30/2008 1/6/2010 10/10/2012157 
2/25/2013 
dismissed 
Citimortgage
158 9/2/2010 2/14/2011 1/31/2012159 
8/14/2013 
foreclosure 
Citimortgage
160 2/4/2009 7/6/2010 9/25/2012161 5/8/2013 
Citimortgage
162 1/24/2011 7/11/2011 5/17/2012163 
8/16/2012 
dismissed 
CHART A: SMALL SAMPLE OF PROPERTIES WITH 
MULTIPLE FORECLOSURES 
 
In each case a foreclosure judgment was set aside and then 
the loan was sold to PennyMac, allowing PennyMac to file a new 
foreclosure action. Not all loans sold to PennyMac fell 
immediately back into foreclosure. It is not possible to track those 
loans through the court docket system.  Chart A above is a very 
small sample of cases I discovered where one lender foreclosed, 
moved to set aside the judgment and then sold the loan. This is 
representative of the fact that at least some “zombie titles” are 
                                                          
 156  CitiMortgage v. Luse, No. 91C02-0811-MF-00105 (White Cnty., Ind. 
Cir. Ct. Dec. 30, 2008). 
 157  PennyMac Corp. v. Luse, No. 91C01-1210-MF-000108 (White Cnty., 
Ind. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2012). 
 158  CitiMortgage v. Westover, No. 89D01-0904-MF-052 (Wayne Cnty., 
Ind. Super. Ct. Sept. 02, 2010). 
 159  PennyMac Corp. v. Westover, No. 89D01-1201-MF-00041 (Wayne 
Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct. I Aug. 14, 2013). 
 160  CitiMortgage v. Gillespie, No. 37C01-0912-MF-000634 (Jasper Cnty., 
Ind. Cir. Ct. Feb. 04, 2009). 
 161  PennyMac v.Corp. v. Gillespie, No. 37C01-1209-MF-000934 (Jasper 
Cnty., Ind. Cir. Ct. May 08, 2013). 
 162  CitiMortgage v. Waller, No. 10C01-1101-MF-00036 (Clark Cnty., Ind. 
Cir. Ct. May 11, 2011). 
 163  PennyMac Corp. v. Waller, No. 10C02-1205-MF-000248 (Clark Cnty., 
Ind. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2012). 
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being repackaged and resold, either alone or as part of new 
securities. 
The re-securitization of nonperforming loans, especially 
when they are combined with new loans originated by 
individuals who contributed so heavily to the last mortgage crisis, 
should be cause for concern.164 The securitization of subprime 
loans was a major contributor to the 2008 economic downturn.165 
Regulators should not allow those loans at the center of the crisis 
to be simply repackaged and reprocessed. They will re-explode. 
B.  The Dual Track 
It would be both unfair and inaccurate to claim that all 
efforts to vacate foreclosure judgment are deceptive, inaccurate 
or done for the sole benefit of the lender.  Sometimes the parties 
really do reach an agreement. Evidence of this was also found in 
court files. One example is HSBC Bank v. Harvell.166 A complaint 
for foreclosure was filed on May 7, 2012.167 The homeowners 
failed to respond and a default was entered on July 17.168 On 
August 9, the lender filed a praecipe asking the sheriff to set the 
home for sheriff’s sale.169 On August 16, the homeowners sent a 
letter to the court, explaining that they were seeking a loan 
modification and had just been asked for another set of 
documents for the loan servicer.170 On April 15, 2013, the bank 
filed to vacate the judgment because the parties had reached an 
agreement, presumably a loan modification.171 
The homeowner in this situation was able to stop the 
foreclosure and the judgment was set aside. It is troubling, 
                                                          
 164  Gandel, supra note 154. 
 165  Commission Report, supra note 2, at 125. See generally ADAM B. 
ASHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., 
UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT 
(Mar. 2008). 
 166  Chronological Case Summary, HSBC Bank v. Harvell, No. 20C01-
1205-MF-00355 (Elkhart Cnty., Ind. Cir. Ct. Sept. 22, 2013) [hereinafter 
Harvell Case Summary]. 
 167 Id. at 1 (Minute Entry, May 9, 2012). 
 168  Id. (Minute Entry, July 19, 2012). 
 169  Id. (Minute Entry, Aug. 9, 2012); IND. CODE ANN. §32-29-7-3 (West 
2013). 
 170  Harvell Case Summary, supra note 166, at 1 (Minute Entry, Aug. 23, 
2012). 
 171  Id. at 2 (Minute Entry,  Apr. 17, 2013). 
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however, how quickly this case proceeded from filing to 
judgment when the home owner was engaged in loss mitigation. 
This is symptomatic of the dual tracking problem that has been 
common in the industry.172 
Dual tracking is the process by which lenders pursue both 
loss mitigation and foreclosure consecutively.173 The homeowner 
is often told not to worry about the foreclosure process and, as a 
result, fails to appear in the foreclosure case filed in court. The 
result is that many homeowners are faithfully working with the 
bank to save their home, only to learn that a default has been 
entered and the home foreclosed.174 Dual tracking has been very 
controversial.175 
In April of 2011, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bowed to 
considerable pressure and modified their servicing guidelines.176 
Servicers were instructed not to commence or conclude a 
foreclosure if loss mitigation was in process.177 On February 14, 
2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued rules 
meant to restrict the practice of “dual tracking.”178 The tragedy is 
that the restriction is too little too late. Many of the homeowners 
who faced dual tracking have already lost their homes. Vacating 
foreclosure judgments that occur in the context of “dual tracking” 
may actually benefit some homeowners; however, eliminating the 
practice would benefit many more homeowners. 
                                                          
 172 Sharon Schmickle & Sarah Rose Miller, ‘Dual Tracking’ trap: Owners 
lose homes while trying to modify mortgages, MINNEAPOLIS POST (Mar. 21, 
2013), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2013/03/dual-tracking-trap-
owners-lose-homes-while-trying-modify-mortgages. 
 173  CFPB Rules Establish Strong Protections for homeowners facing 
foreclosure, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-
bureau-rules-establish-strong-protections-for-homeowners-facing-foreclosure/. 
 174  Id. 
 175  See generally, Schmickle, supra note 172; Shahien Nasiripour, National 
Mortgage Settlement Review Prompts Dual-Track Discussions With Banks,  
HUFFINGTON POST (June 19, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/19/national-mortgage-settlement-
dual-tracking_n_3468307.html?view=print&comm_ref=false. 
 176  Frannie Mae and Freddie Mac to Align Guidelines for Servicing 
Delinquent Mortgages, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY (Apr. 28, 2011), 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/21190/sai42811final.pdf. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 10696 (proposed Feb. 14, 2013) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). 
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C.  Distressed Asset Stabilization Program 
The number of motions to vacate seems to be increasing.179 
Several recent cases that have come before the St. Joseph 
Superior Courts raise additional concerns.180 These cases are 
significant both because of the reasons articulated for vacating 
the judgments and the underlying circumstances of each of the 
homeowners. The first case is Bank of America, N.A. v. Kimes.181  
The complaint to foreclose this mortgage was filed on September 
17, 2012.182 Mr. Kimes died of cancer four months earlier on May 
18, 2012.183 A default judgment was entered on May 10, 2013.184 
In July, the bank requested that the judgment be vacated because 
“the subject matter of this present litigation is no longer at 
issue.”185 The court questioned how the matter could possibly be 
resolved in loss litigation when Mr. Kimes was deceased.186 The 
attorneys for the bank explained that they were required to set 
the judgment aside by the U.S Department of Housing and 
Urban Development’s (H.U.D.) Distressed Asset Stabilization 
Program.187 
Soon after, a second motion to set aside judgment was 
filed in Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Estrada.188 This foreclosure 
was filed in 2012.189 The homeowner failed to respond and a 
                                                          
 179  See, e.g., Hearing Transcript, supra note 88, at 12-13. 
 180  Id. at 6; Interview with Hon. Jenny Pitts Manier, St. Joseph Cnty. 
Super. Ct. Judge (Sept. 4, 2013). 
 181  See Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and to 
Dismiss Complaint to Foreclose Mortgage, Bank of America, N.A. v. Kimes, 
No. 71-D0571D05-1209-MF-00617 (St. Joseph Cnty., Ind. Cir. Ct. July 10, 2012) 
[hereinafter Kimes Motion to Set Aside Judgment]. 
 182  Id. 
 183  Mark Kimes Obituary, PALMER FUNERAL HOMES, 
http://www.palmerfuneralhomes.com/obits/obituary.php?id=178421 (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2010). 
 184  See Kimes Motion to Set Aside Judgment, supra note 181. 
 185  Id. at ¶ 1. 
 186  Interview with Hon. Jenny Pitts Manier, St. Joseph Cnty. Super. Ct. 
Judge (Aug. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Judge Manier Interview]. 
 187  Id. 
 188  Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and to Dismiss 
Complaint to Foreclose Mortgage, Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Estrada, No. 71-
D05-1212-MF-00787 (St. Joseph Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct. July 19, 2013) [hereinafter 
Estrada Motion to Set Aside Judgment]. 
 189  Complaint on Note and to Foreclose Mortgage on Real Estate, 
Estrada, No. 71-D05-1212-MF-00787 (filed Dec. 10, 2012). 
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default judgment was entered on May 10, 2013.190 The motion to 
set aside the judgment also claimed “the subject matter of this 
present litigation is no longer at issue.”191 Again, the judge 
inquired as to the real reason for the motion and was again told it 
was required by HUD or perhaps directed by Fannie Mae.192 
In July 2012, HUD announced the Distressed Asset 
Stabilization Program, a program to offer pools of defaulted loans 
to investors.193 The stated intention of the program is to allow 
“pools of mortgages headed for foreclosure to be sold to qualified 
bidders and charges them with helping to bring the loan out of 
default.”194 In order to be part of the program the loan must be at 
least six months delinquent, the servicer must have exhausted 
loss mitigation options and the foreclosure must have been 
initiated.195 It is too early to know if the sale of these notes will 
truly offer new hope for struggling homeowners and 
neighborhoods. The initial pools of loans were sold in September 
2012.196 They were divided into one national pool and one 
neighborhood stabilization pool of loans originating from 
Chicago, Illinois; Newark, New Jersey; Phoenix, Arizona; and 
Tampa, Florida—all areas previously identified as having high 
numbers of abandoned foreclosures and vacant homes.197 
Consumer advocates are dubious of the Distressed Asset 
Stabilization Program’s ability to provide relief to struggling 
homeowners and neighborhoods.198 
The National Consumer Law Center has issued several 
                                                          
 190  Default Judgment Entry and Decree of Foreclosure, Estrada, No. 71-
D05-1212-MF-00787 (entered May 10, 2013). 
 191  Estrada Motion to Set Aside Judgment, supra note 188 at ¶ 1. 
 192  Judge Manier Interview, supra note 186. 
 193  HUD No. 12-116, supra note 71. 
 194  U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. HUD NO. 12-187, HUD 
ANNOUNCES PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF NOTE SALES UNDER EXPANDED 
DISTRESSED ASSET STABILIZATION PROGRAM (Dec. 3, 2012) [hereinafter HUD 
No. 12-187], 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2
012/HUDNo.12-187. 
 195  Id. 
 196  Nathaniel Cushman, HUD Announces September 2012 Loan Sale, 
NIXON PEABODY AFFORDABLE HOUS. RES. CTR. (July 25, 2012, 11:02 AM), 
http://web20.nixonpeabody.com/ahrc/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=023e142d%2
Dcf9f%2D44c8%2D8bf3%2D5aaaeeb635b8&ID=45. 
 197  Id. 
 198  FHA REFORM, supra note 71; HOME RETENTION GOALS, supra note 71. 
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responses and recommendations regarding this program.199 One 
of the concerns is that the program will reward those servicers 
who delay “loss mitigation reviews beyond the time frames 
allowed” by allowing them to sell the loan without really having 
done loss mitigation.200 The program may also be encouraging 
lenders to “un-foreclose” some long abandoned properties in an 
effort to remove these properties from their books instead of 
focusing on saving the homes in default that have not yet been 
foreclosed. The short amount of time between some of these 
judgments and motions to vacate suggests that better 
communication between the servicers and their counsel could 
prevent the delay in resolving the foreclosure caused by 
foreclosing and then vacating judgments. It may also prevent 
some people from abandoning their home because they thought 
the foreclosure judgment was the end of their opportunity to save 
the home.201 The theory behind the program is that the investor 
will be able to work with the homeowner to remain in the home, 
but in reality by the time the loans reach the program most of 
these homeowners will be long gone. One concern is that this 
kind of program may result in once stable neighborhoods 
becoming transient, rental neighborhoods.202 At the same time, 
rental homes are better than abandoned homes. 
The cases coming before the St. Joseph Superior Court 
raise other, serious concerns. It is not credible that the reason for 
setting aside a judgment for a deceased borrower is to increase 
the opportunity for the borrower to engage in loss mitigation. Are 
these programs really designed to increase the opportunity for 
loss mitigation, as advertised,203 or are they instead encouraging, 
or even mandating, the setting aside of previously entered 
judgments so that HUD, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can 
unload assets? I submitted an inquiry to HUD asking whether or 
not loan servicers were being instructed to set aside judgments in 
                                                          
 199  Id. 
 200  HOME RETENTION GOALS, supra note 71. 
 201  GAO-11-93, supra note 10, at 17-18 (finding that homeowners are much 
more likely to abandon a property if the loan is charged off after foreclosure than if 
it is charged off before foreclosure is initiated). 
 202  Julie Schmit, Home rentals—the new American Dream?, USA TODAY ( 
last updated June 6, 2012, 10:02 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/story/2012-06-05/are-
home-rentals-the-new-american-dream/55402648/1. 
 203 See HUD No. 12-187, supra note 194. 
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order for the underlying loans to be included in this program.204 I 
was told that their attorney would get back to me.205 No one 
has.206 
IV.  DEFICENCY JUDGMENTS AND DEBT BUYERS 
It should now be clear that a motivating factor—if not the 
motivating factor—in the abandoned and zombie foreclosures is 
lenders ability to sell the notes into the secondary market. The 
secondary market is a market of investors and debt buyers. The 
debts differ depending on whether they are secured, as in the 
selling of a note to an investor, or unsecured, as in the selling of a 
note, without the mortgage, or the deficiency judgment. The 
relationship between the abandoned foreclosure problem and the 
debt collection problem was well articulated by St. Joseph 
Superior Court Judge Jenny Manier: 
Well, if I’m a defendant against whom an in rem 
judgment has been entered, I’ve lost the property and I 
have no deficiency judgment. Judgment’s vacated, 
which what, gives rise or resuscitates the debt and the 
bank says, you know, we don’t want to be stuck with 
this piece of property and this debt that we’ll be 
collecting for the next 20 years, let’s sell the underlying 
debt to someone else for dimes on the dollar, pocket the 
money and count on it as loss mitigation. And then the 
purchases is now going after this person, this defendant 
who thought they had walked away by losing just their 
home but without any deficiency. And all of a sudden 
someone is suing them for the same judgment that they 
thought had been resolved.207 
A.  The Deficiency Judgment 
As mentioned previously, it is clear that some foreclosure 
                                                          
 204  E-mail from author to John Hall, Indianapolis Field Officer, HUD, 
(Aug. 14, 2013) (on file with author). 
 205  Email from John Hall, supra note 204, to author. (Aug. 14, 2013) (on 
file with author). 
 206  There has been no response as of September 10, 2013. 
 207  Hearing Transcript, supra note 88, at 7 (explaining to lender’s counsel 
why she is concerned with setting aside an in rem judgment of foreclosure). 
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judgments are being vacated solely to facilitate the sale of the 
loan.208 Others are vacated because the homeowner obtained a 
loan modification or reinstated the loan. It is also clear that some 
homeowners, in the end, cannot climb out from under the debt 
and the property is foreclosed, leaving them with a deficiency 
judgment. Below is one extreme example of this, taken from 
Howard County, Indiana. These are all foreclosures on the same 
property, against the same property owner, filed from 2003 
through 2008: 
 
CHART B: THE HISTORY OF ONE LOAN IN INDIANA 
                                                          
 208  It is also possible that some of these are simply servicer changes. It is 
virtually impossible to determine who owns a loan when looking at the 
pleadings. 
 209  Civil Case Detail, Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Newburn, No. 
34D02-0310-MF-00950 (Howard Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct.) (Doxpop). 
 210  Civil Case Detail, Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Newburn, No. 
34D01-0501-MF-00062 (Howard Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct.) (Doxpop). 
 211  Civil Case Detail, Irwin Mortg. Corp. v. Newburn, et. al., No. 34D02-0608-
MF-00776 (Howard Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct.) (Doxpop). 
 212  Civil Case Detail, ABN AMRO Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Newburn, No. 34 
D040705-MF-00476 (Howard Cnty., Ind. Super. Ct.) (Doxpop). 
 213  Civil Case Detail, Citimortgage, Inc. v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0803-MF-
00240 (Howard Cnty., Ind. Cir. Ct.) (Doxpop). 
 214  Civil Case Detail, Citimortgage, Inc. v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0811-MF-
01164 (Howard Cnty., Ind. Cir. Ct.) (Doxpop). 
PLAINTIFF 
DATE 
FORECLOSURE 
FILED 
DATE OF 
JUDGMENT 
AMOUNT 
OF 
JUDGMENT 
VACATED 
AND NOTE 
REINSTATED 
MERS209 10/ 3/2003 12/ 18/ 2003 $141,544.39 2/9/2004 
MERS210 1/3/2005 3/6/2005 $146,944.51 8/25/2005 
Irwin 
Mortgage211 8/17/2006 10/17/2006 $146,957.37 10/24/2006 
ABN 
AMRO212 5/1/2007 7/31/2007 
$140, 
062.83 11/20/2007 
Citimortgage
213 3/11/2008 4/16/2008 $140,462.45 11/25/2008 
Citimortgage
214 11/21/2008 1/20/2009 $140,075.96 
8/19/2009 
judgment 
assigned 
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The property in question is located in Kokomo, Indiana. 
On October 3, 2003 Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems 
(MERS) filed a foreclosure action, obtaining a default judgment 
two months later.215 On February 9, 2004 that judgment was 
vacated and, according to the court, the “note and mortgage 
canceled by merger in the judgment are hereby reinstated.”216 
Eleven months later, MERS filed another foreclosure.217 Again, a 
default judgment was entered. The amount of the judgment has 
now increased from $141, 544.39 to $146, 944.51, a difference of 
$5,400.12.218 It appears from the figures that few, if any, 
payments were made in the intervening year. Five months after 
entry of the default judgment, the court again vacated the 
judgment and reinstated the loan.219 
The next foreclosure on this property was filed by Irwin 
Mortgage in August of 2006, a year after the previous judgment 
was vacated.220 It too obtained a default judgment.221  
Interestingly, this judgment was only slightly larger than the 
previous judgment, suggesting some payments had been made. 
One month later, Irwin set the judgment aside and reinstated the 
note.222 The speed at which this judgment was set aside, coupled 
with the significant decrease in the next judgment amount (see 
Chart B, above), suggests the homeowners may have reinstated 
the loan by bringing it current at this point. Apparently, though, 
it did not last. 
On May 1, 2007, ABN AMRO filed to foreclose on the 
same mortgage, now for the fourth time in as many years.223 
Again, it obtained a default foreclosure judgment and quickly 
moved to vacate the judgment and re-instate the note.224 
                                                          
 215  Civil Case Detail at 2, Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Newburn, 
No. 34D02-0310-MF-00950 (Minute Entry, Dec. 18, 2003). 
 216  Id. at 3, (Minute Entry, Feb. 9, 2004). 
 217  Id. at 1, (Minute Entry, Jan. 21, 2004). 
 218  Id. at 2 (Minute Entry, March 6, 2005). 
 219  Id. at 3 (Minute Entry, Aug. 25, 2005). 
 220  Civil Case Detail at 2, Irwin Mortg. Corp. v. Newburn, No. 34D02-0608-
MF-00776 (Minute Entry, Aug. 17, 2006). 
 221  Id. at 2-3 (Minute Entry, Oct. 24, 2006). 
 222  Id. at 3 (Minute Entry, Nov. 2, 2006). 
 223  Civil Case Detail at 1-2, ABN AMRO Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Newburn, No. 
34D04-0705-MF-00476 (Minute Entry, May 1, 2007). 
 224  Id. at 2 (minute entries of default judgment on July 31, 2007 and vacating 
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Citimortgage entered the picture on March 11, 2008 when it filed 
the fifth attempt to foreclose on this property.225 It obtained a 
judgment and also vacated it, reinstating the note and mortgage 
on November 25, 2008.226 
The reason for vacating this judgment is clear: four days 
earlier, on November 21, 2008, Citimortgage had filed another 
foreclosure action on this same note and mortgage.227  Indiana, 
like most states, does not permit a plaintiff to bring a second 
action to foreclose when it is currently “prosecuting any other 
action for the same debt.”228 It is odd that Citimortgage would 
chose to set aside a judgment it had already obtained in the first 
filing, as opposed to dismissing the second, extraneous filing, but 
it did. The last and final foreclosure judgment was entered on 
January 20, 2009 against the owners for $140,075.96 plus interest 
and costs.229 
The county land records show that on November 10 the 
property was transferred from the homeowners to Fannie Mae, 
and then to a third party purchaser.230 The price paid by the 
purchaser was $22,000.231 The homeowners now owe a deficiency 
judgment of over $120,000.232 That judgment was promptly 
assigned to a debt buyer, Dyke O’Neal.233 Dyke O’Neal claims to 
be “a leading nationwide purchaser, collector and servicer of real 
                                                          
judgment on Nov. 20, 2007). 
 225  Civil Case Detail at 2, Citimortgage, Inc. v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0803-
MF-00240 (Minute Entry, Mar. 11, 2008). 
 226  Id. at 2-3 (minute entries: entering foreclosure judgment on Apr. 16, 2008; 
vacating judgment and reinstating note on Nov. 25, 2008). 
 227  Civil Case Detail at 3, Citimortgage, Inc. v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0811-
MF-01164 (Minute Entry, Nov. 21, 2008). 
 228  IND. CODE § 32-30-10-10 (2013). 
 229  “Court now grants the Application and now finds in favor of the 
Plaintiff, Citimortgage, Inc. and against the Defendants, in the sum of 
$140,075.96, plus interest and costs, all per DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
ENTERED. Furthermore, Court now finds the property commonly known as 
1105 Witherspoon, Kokomo, IN 46901 herein foreclosed and ordered sold by 
the Sheriff of Howard County all per Decree of Foreclosure.” Civil Case 
Detail, Citimortgage v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0811-MF-01164 (Minute Entry, 
Jan. 20, 2009). 
 230  Id. 
 231  Id. 
 232  Id. 
 233  Civil Case Detail, Citimortgage v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0811-MF-
01164 (Minute Entry, Aug. 19, 2009). 
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estate deficiencies.”234 They set to work immediately to collect the 
deficiency in this matter.235 Unsurprisingly, the homeowner filed 
bankruptcy, notifying the court on April 25, 2012.236 
A deficiency judgment is the amount of money a 
homeowner may still owe the lender if, after foreclosure, the 
home is not worth as much as the underlying mortgage debt.237 
Deficiency judgments have always been an issue in hard 
economic times. In this crisis, policy makers focused on the loan 
modification as a solution.238 In the depression, the relief offered 
was restrictions on deficiency judgments.239 Challenges to this 
relief were decided in the borrowers’ favor when, in Gelfert v. 
National City Bank of New York,240 the United States Supreme 
Court held that a state may restrict the lender’s recourse in a 
mortgage foreclosure. Several states have restricted or eliminated 
                                                          
 234  DYKE O’NEAL, INC., http://www.dyckoneal.com/ (last visited 
September 9, 2013). It should be noted that the state of Georgia has a Cease 
and Desist Order against this company for operating as a mortgage lender and 
broker without a license. DEPARTMENT’S ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST 
AGAINST DYCK-O’NEAL, INC. BECOMES FINAL, GA. DEP’T OF BANKING AND 
FIN. (May 22, 2009) [hereinafter Georgia Cease and Desist Order], 
http://dbf.georgia.gov/press-releases/2009-06-30/departments-order-cease-
desist-against-dyck-oneal-inc-becomes-final/. The state of Massachusetts has a 
consent order relating to violations of the Massachusetts debt collection laws. 
DYKE O’NEAL, INC. – CONSENT ORDER, MASS. OFFICE OF CONSUMER 
AFFAIRS AND BUS. REGULATION (May 5, 2011), 
http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/business/banking-services/banking-legal-
resources/enforcement-actions/2011-dob-enforcement-actions/dyck-oneal-inc-
consent-order.html. 
 235  It should also be noted that Dyke O’Neal does not, according to the 
Indiana Secretary of State, have the required license to act as a debt collector 
in Indiana. 
 236  Civil Case Detail, Citimortgage v. Newburn, No. 34C01-0811-MF-
01164 (Minute Entry, Apr. 25, 2012). 
 237  Deficiency judgments are allowed in some form in the majority of the 
states. Twelve, including some of those hit hardest by this crisis such as 
California and Arizona, have passed statutes barring deficiency judgments in 
most circumstances. Twenty other states limit the impact of the deficiency by 
requiring the lender to calculate the deficiency based on market value and not 
the price obtained in sheriff sale. Unfortunately, Indiana falls in neither camp 
and allows deficiency judgments in every situation. Foreclosure Defense, supra 
note 31, app. E, at 547-49. 
 238  White, supra note 52, at 514. 
 239  D. J. Farage, Mortgage Deficiency Judgment Acts and Their 
Constitutionality, 41 DICK. L. REV. 67 (1937). 
 240  Gelfert v. Nat’l City Bank of New York, 313 U.S. 221, 235, 61 S. Ct. 898, 
85 L. Ed. 1299 (1941). 
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the right to a deficiency judgment.241 Most states allow for at least 
some collection of deficiency judgments.242 Indiana has no real 
restrictions. 
The Newburn cases illustrated above are extreme, or are 
they? Numerous loans have been coming in and out of 
foreclosure since the start of this crisis.243 This case shows us just 
how large a deficiency a homeowner can accumulate in a 
depressed housing market. It also raises serious questions about 
the servicing of this loan. A significant amount of legal time and 
energy went into the filing of six successive foreclosure actions, 
two even pending at the same time. The case is symptomatic of a 
chaotic industry. The homeowner incurred attorney’s fees in each 
of the filings. 
The lack of meaningful communication between the 
servicer and its foreclosure attorney is another problem evident in 
this and many foreclosure cases. The foreclosing attorney is often 
communicating to its client through the same toll free numbers as 
the consumers.244 An example of this can be seen in the exchange 
between the court and JP Morgan Chase’s foreclosure counsel in 
the hearing to set aside a foreclosure judgment previously 
discussed.245 The only message the attorney received from his 
client was “loss mitigation.”246 He was not told that, a month 
earlier, this home had been sold in a short sale with the full 
knowledge and approval of his client.247 While it is desirable to 
encourage loss mitigation, real loss mitigation requires real 
communication between all the stakeholders in the process. 
It does not appear from the court file that much loss 
mitigation occurred for this homeowner in Kokomo. However, 
because the homeowner could well have been working with the 
lender and the lender did not communicate this information to its 
counsel, it is equally possible that loss mitigation was occurring 
                                                          
 241  Foreclosure Defense, supra note 31, app. E, at 547-53. Twelve states 
bar deficiency judgments. Id. at 548. 
 242  Of the thirty-eight states that allow some form of deficiency, twenty 
have enacted at least some restrictions. Id. 
 243  See, generally White, supra note 52 (Allen M. White on the old mod 
model). 
 244  Since 2011, I have facilitated hundreds of settlement conferences 
between the homeowner and their counsel. This is a common complaint of 
lender’s counsel. 
 245  See supra text accompanying notes 135-53. 
 246  Hearing Transcript, supra note 88, at 3. 
 247  See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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throughout the process.248 At the same time, there were not many 
successful loss mitigation options available when the first four 
cases were filed.249 The homeowner failed to appear in all of the 
six cases filed and the foreclosure fees mounted. Yet, each time a 
judgment was entered it was set aside and the note sold. A home 
in foreclosure for over five years must increase the fees and the 
ultimate balance due. In the end, this home sold for less than 15% 
of the judgment. The delay in foreclosing is at least partially 
responsible for this increase. 
The growing balance is one of the problems with the 
collection of deficiency judgments. Once entered, the judgment 
continues to accrue interest in Indiana at the judgment interest 
rate, currently 8%.250 Another is the complete lack of information 
provided to the homeowner. There is a record of the court 
judgment in the court file and, presumably, a copy of that order is 
sent to the borrower. However, there is no record of the amount, 
if any, of the deficiency. Only some courts make any note of it at 
all. Some states require confirmation of the judgment.251 The 
third, and most disturbing, is that by allowing lenders to set aside 
agreed “in rem” judgments courts have resurrected the possibility 
of a deficiency judgment that the homeowner believed he had 
avoided by agreeing to judgment in the first place.252 Once 
obtained, the deficiency debt enters the murky world of debt 
collection, already awash in bad information and controversial 
practices.253 
B.  The Debt Buyer 
It is not clear how many debt buyers are in the market for 
mortgage debt.254 The federal trade commission recently 
                                                          
 248  See supra Part II.B. for a discussion of dual tracking. 
 249  White, supra note 52 (documenting the lack of success of loss 
mitigation efforts in 2007 and 2008). 
 250  IND. CODE § 24-4.6-1-101(1)(2013). 
 251  Foreclosure Defense, supra note 31, app. E, at 550-52. 
 252  Hearing Transcript, supra note 88, at 6. 
 253  See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPAIRING A BROKEN 
SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND 
ARBITRATION (July 2010), available at 
www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf. 
 254  At the moment, at least, the market seems to be stronger for the 
nonperforming loans, hence the moves to set aside judgments. See Rudolf, 
supra note 70; Said, supra note 70; Yu & Kelly, supra note 133; Morrissey, 
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concluded an investigation of the debt buying industry that 
included specific data on the top nine debt buying firms.255 From 
2005 through 2011, mortgage debt accounted for approximately 
one percent of the debt acquired.256 The average price paid was 
fifty cents on the dollar. The report goes on, however, to clarify 
that these numbers are skewed by the fact that some portfolios 
were tied to performing loans. In fact, “a significant number of 
mortgage portfolios” were acquired for less than one cent per 
dollar.257 The mean price was ten cents per dollar.258 
Dyke O’Neal purchased the debt in the case illustrated in 
Chart B.259 This company claims it has been in the business of 
buying mortgage deficiencies since 1988.260 According to their 
webpage, Dyke O’Neal is “the leading nationwide purchaser, 
collector and servicer of real estate deficiencies.”261 The size and 
opportunities these markets now bring for both legitimate 
investors and bottom-feeding debt collectors has changed due to 
this crisis. As debt collectors, who traditionally shied away from 
mortgage deficiency collection, enter the market, they are likely to 
bring the problems associated with the collection of credit cards 
into the world of mortgage deficiencies.262The problems 
                                                          
supra note 133. 
 255  See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES 
OF THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY (January 2013) [hereinafter Debt Buying], 
available at www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/debtbuyingreport.pdf. The nine firms that 
provided specific data to the study were Sherman Financial, Arrow Financial 
Services, LLC., Encore Capital, Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, Unifund 
Corp., eCast, B-Line LLC., Asta Funding, NCO Portfolio Mgmt.  Id. at 7. 
Because the data is limited to these firms, it is not a complete picture of the 
debt buying marketplace. 
 256  Id. at T-4. 
 257  Id. at T-5. 
 258  Id. 
 259  See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text. 
 260  DYKE-O’NEAL, INC., http://www.dyckoneal.com (last visited 
September 9, 2013). 
 261 Id. But see supra note 234 (describing Cease and Desist Order issued by 
the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance, and Consent Order issued 
by Massachusetts Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation). 
 262  Recent crackdowns on the selling and collecting of credit card debt 
could easily cause debt buyers to search for other revenue streams. See 
generally, Maria Aspan & Jeff Horwitz, Chase Halts Card Debt Sales Ahead of 
Crackdown, AMERICAN BANKER (July 1, 2013, 3:29 PM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_126/chase-halts-card-debt-sales-
ahead-of-crackdown-1060326-1.html (explaining that Chase has halted selling 
its credit card debt because of investigations into robo-signing). The 
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associated with the collection of mortgage debt are already 
surfacing in relation to the collection of second mortgage loan 
debt.263 
The debt collection industry is structured to allow debts to 
be bought and sold with little underlying documentation and 
supporting paperwork.264 When you combine this with the 
recorded paperwork disaster that has become common in the 
world of mortgage foreclosure,265 the results can be nothing but 
bad. 
V.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Abandoned foreclosures and zombie titles pose concerns 
for consumers and their communities. Policy makers need to act 
to mitigate the impact of these problems before they become a 
crisis themselves, the “foreclosure echo.” A review of foreclosure 
processes in Indiana and abandoned homes across the nation 
leads me to recommend the following: 
A.  The Foreclosure Process 
The current judicial foreclosure process may have some 
issues, but the answer is not to speed up the process, as industry 
advocates claim. It is, instead, to determine whether the 
foreclosure can be avoided before you initiate the judicial 
foreclosure process. If loss mitigation were truly incentivized over 
foreclosure, the number of homes moving into foreclosure and 
then stalling could be reduced. When a home is truly abandoned, 
                                                          
investigation will likely spread, as they did in the foreclosure crisis, prompting 
other credit card lenders to also stop selling their debt, at least temporarily. 
 263  Carolyn Said, Homes Lost, but Some 2nd-Mortgage Debts Remain, S.F. 
CHRON. (April 19, 2010, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/Homes-lost-but-some-2nd-mortgage-
debts-remain-3266964.php (explaining the rise in mortgage debt collection on 
second mortgages); Jim Wasserman, Debt Collectors can Come Calling Years 
After a Mortgage Default, WASH. POST, March 27, 2010, at E06. 
 264  Debt Buying, supra note 255, at iii. 
 265  Commission Report, supra note 2, at 407-08 (discussing how the flawed 
paperwork exacerbated foreclosure issues); Allen et al., supra note 16, at 29 
(finding “greater incidence of foreclosure case dismissals (resulting from legal 
and operational problems) is associated with a greater likelihood that a loan 
remains in limbo”); Streitfeld, supra note 63. 
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efforts should be made to quickly foreclosure in a way that allows 
the asset to be purchased and re-occupied before it falls into 
disrepair. The focus should be on the “home” asset and not the 
“loan” asset. 
Lenders should not be rewarded for shoddy loss mitigation 
by allowing them to vacate the judgment and sell the loan. 
Decisions about the economic viability of the foreclosure 
should be made before the foreclosure action is filed to decrease 
the number of homeowners who prematurely leave their homes. 
Servicers must communicate accurate and timely 
information to their counsel to avoid wasted judicial time and the 
filing of frivolous motions. 
Homeowners should be notified when a lender has 
decided to charge-off a loan, cancel a sale or otherwise abandon a 
foreclosure. 
Dual tracking is alive and well, despite efforts to the 
contrary. It needs to finally and completely end. 
The loss mitigation system is still too slow, too long and 
too confusing. The industry can, and should, agree to one short 
set of paperwork that can be completed and processed in a 
manner that does not drag on for years. 
Lenders that have no interest in the asset should waive 
their mortgages to allow homeowners and municipalities ways to 
transfer the property to an occupying buyer. 
B.  The Court Process 
The court process begins and ends with knowledgeable 
judges. Judges need to understand the implications of vacating 
judgments on the homeowner and the community. Courts are 
best able to control the time a foreclosure remains in process. 
Unfortunately, courts are also overburdened and understaffed. 
Policymakers need to address those issues as well. 
Judges need to be educated as to the many implications of 
setting aside a foreclosure judgment. 
Requiring creditors to comply with Trial Rule 60 would 
end most of the abuses. 
Courts should better control their dockets by dismissing 
foreclosure actions that have been open with no activity for long 
periods of time. 
All deficiency amounts should be accurately recorded in 
the record and readily accessible to the consumer. 
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C.  Policy-Makers 
This problem will grow as the economy improves. 
Creditors and debt collectors, who previously saw no hope of 
recovery, will soon have wages to garnish. Simple steps can be 
taken now to prevent this from becoming a second foreclosure 
debt crisis. 
The re-securitization of zombie mortgage debt needs to be 
closely monitored by regulators. 
The debt buying industry must be required to have 
complete and accurate information of the deficiency judgment 
and the documents to prove it, before collection proceedings can 
be initiated. 
Lenders should be required to inform homeowners when 
they cancel a sheriff’s sale, not just when they initiate one. 
These suggestions are all simple, easily implemented steps. 
I am not the first to offer many of them. We are in a position to 
mitigate the possible fallout of the foreclosure crisis. Policymakers 
can choose to get ahead of the problem or wait to clean up 
another mess. I encourage them to choose the former. As the 
evidence shows, it is not the homeowners who are walking away 
from their mortgage; it is the mortgage industry that has walked 
away from the homeowners. It is long since passed the time to 
turn them around. 
 
